A Position Paper on United States Nuclear Weapons Policies

Psychologists bring to the issue of nuclear weapons an understanding of how threats too horrible to contemplate may often be banished from awareness and how the institutions that promote and develop nuclear weapons may underestimate the dangerous consequences of their work. The magnitude of the combined risks of blast, firestorm and radiation make nuclear weapons a danger of unprecedented magnitude. Nuclear weapons during the Cold War were once justified as a deterrent. By making a response to a nuclear attack immediate and automatic it was assumed that an adversary would be deterred by the threat of mutual assured destruction. This would only work if the adversary were sane and unwilling to engage in a suicidal attack, and if the address from which the attack was launched could be known with certainty. Neither of these assumptions applies to circumstances of the 21^st century. There are many countries in the nuclear club. They have differing standards for exchange of weapons-grade materials; their scientists reflect a variety of loyalties. They have shifting alliances with other nations and some have connections with non-governmental military groups. There is a dangerous volatility in a situation in which one irrational action could precipitate a nuclear war with unprecedented destruction.

While public attention has been focused upon terrorism, nuclear weapons policies have gone relatively unnoticed. The likelihood of nuclear weapons being used either by intention or by accident has increased and the danger of accident from nuclear power generators persists. With the U.S. nuclear arsenal of some 10,000 nuclear weapons, and with policies to research more usable nuclear weapons while ignoring international obligations for nuclear disarmament, there are critical issues that require public attention and informed debate.

Current U.S. Nuclear Weapon Policies

The U.S. continues to rely upon its nuclear arsenal to threaten retaliation against a nuclear attack and has extended this threat of nuclear retaliation to chemical and biological weapons attacks or threats on the U.S., as well as its troops or allies, wherever they are located in the world.

Despite previous promises not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, the U.S. has developed contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against five non-nuclear weapon states: Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria and Libya. (It is possible, but still not certain, that North Korea has now developed a small nuclear arsenal.)

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The U.S. has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in order to develop missile defenses, making way for the development of space weapons, despite promising to preserve and strengthen this treaty.

The U.S. has not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, despite making commitments to do so. While it still adheres to the nuclear testing moratorium, except for what have been labeled sub-critical tests and computer simulations, it has allocated funds to reduce the time needed to ready the Nevada Test Site to resume testing.

The U.S. has entered into the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with the Russians to reduce the deployed long-range nuclear weapons on each side to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the year 2012, but has failed to make these reductions irreversible in accord with the consensus agreement at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Additionally, the treaty terminates in 2012 unless extended. Despite this agreement, each side continues to keep some 2,250 nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, poised to attack the other at a moment’s notice.

The U.S. has ended a decade-long Congressional ban on research and development of nuclear weapons under 5 kilotons (mini-nukes) and has allocated funds to perform research on the development of such weapons, increasing the likelihood of use of nuclear weapons and blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons.

The U.S. has allocated funds for researching more powerful Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator weapons, another way of making nuclear weapons more usable and therefore more likely to be used.

The U.S. has allocated funds to create a facility to produce some 450 plutonium pits annually that could only be used for new nuclear weapons. This suggests to other nations that the U.S. is planning to further develop new nuclear weapons and to possess and rely upon nuclear weapons for the indefinite future.

The U.S. has not adhered to the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament agreed to in the year 2000 by the states that are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the five declared nuclear weapon states.

Critical Issues

Clearly, the pattern of nuclear weapons policy in the U.S. has been one in which the continued development of nuclear weapons and their potential use are considered acceptable. This attitude fails to give credence to the magnitude of the danger involved and to the policies needed to reduce and eliminate these weapons. Moreover, U.S. policies legitimize such weapons among leaders of other nations who view them as symbols of power and as deterrents against their use by the U.S. or other nuclear powers.

A significant threat to U.S. security arises from the possibility of extremists getting their hands on nuclear weapons and using them against a U.S. city. The best way to prevent this possibility is to reduce nuclear weapons globally to a low number and assure that the remaining weapons are kept under strict control. It would also be necessary to establish a global inventory of weapons grade fissile materials and the facilities capable of producing these materials and to place these under strict international control. Given that U.S. policies have obstructed these actions, they can take place only if the U.S. changes its nuclear weapon policies and takes leadership in promoting this course of action. The U.S. would also have to provide additional funds to help assure the dismantlement and control of the aging Russian nuclear arsenal.

India and Pakistan, relatively recent additions to the nuclear weapons club, have indicated that they are willing to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, but not unless all other countries will do so as well. They are not willing to live in a world of nuclear apartheid, further demonstrating that the effort to achieve nuclear disarmament requires U.S. leadership.

By branding nations as part of an "Axis of Evil" and by demonstrating willingness to engage in preventive warfare against Iraq, the U.S. provides incentives to other countries, such as North Korea, to develop nuclear deterrent forces. North Korea has indicated that it is willing to dismantle its nuclear program and rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty if it is given security assurances by the U.S., and economic aid. This seems like a solid basis on which to establish an agreement that would benefit both North Korea and the international community.

U.S. policy regarding nuclear weapons must deal with both the technical needs for safety and the social-psychological consequences of its policies upon other nations in the world community. A responsible U.S. nuclear policy should include the following:

1. Removing all U.S. nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert, in conjunction with similar initiatives from Russia.

2. Ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and supporting a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty that would place all weapons-grade nuclear materials in all countries under strict and effective international control.

3. Reinstituting U.S. Negative Security Assurances not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.

5. Making all reductions in nuclear armaments irreversible through treaty agreements and verified inspection procedures.

6. Putting the development of missile defenses and space weaponization on hold while negotiating for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

7. Fulfilling U.S. obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for "a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date" by ceasing to perform research on developing new nuclear weapons.

8. Fulfilling further U.S. obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty “to pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament" by adhering to the agreed upon Practical Steps, including "an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals."

9. Assuring work with dignity and positive social purpose for all displaced scientists and engineers (from all nations) who have worked on nuclear weapons, thereby removing their incentive to market themselves internationally to nations or groups who might develop weapons programs.

10. Cleaning up the still dangerous wastes from former and current sites of nuclear weapons development without invoking new risks of transporting them or burying them where they cannot be monitored.

As psychologists we recognize perceptions and motivations that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Current U.S. nuclear weapon policies are more likely to incite than to prevent acts of terror. The prevention of unspeakable tragedy from military actions using nuclear weapons, whether by the U.S. or by any other nation, depends upon the ability to greatly reduce and monitor the number of nuclear weapons now active and to eliminate all programs for nuclear weapons development. Without such changes in U.S. nuclear policy, nuclear weapons will eventually find their way into the hands of extremists, and it seems likely that nuclear weapons will be used, by accident or design.

Additionally, serious U.S. efforts to achieve both regional and global prohibitions on weapons of mass destruction, nuclear and otherwise, will aid the country in resuming the leadership role that it has lost in recent years due to policies of unilateralism, exceptionalism, and belligerence, policies reflective of double standards in both law and morality. Leadership in the movement toward nuclear disarmament will enhance global security and increase worldwide respect for the United States.

Because of the importance of this issue, PsySR has developed a Handbook to help activists in the task of achieving nuclear disarmament. It may be found on the website.

Much of this position is developed from reports by David Krieger of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation November 2002, August 19, 2003 and February, 2004.