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What is Groupthink?
Groupthink, a term
coined by social psychologist Irving Janis (1972), occurs when a group makes
faulty decisions because group pressures lead to a deterioration of “mental
efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment” (p. 9). Groups affected by
groupthink ignore alternatives and tend to take irrational actions that
dehumanize other groups. A group is especially vulnerable to groupthink when
its members are similar in background, when the group is insulated from
outside opinions, and when there are no clear rules for decision making.
References
(also see annotated bibliography of books,
articles and websites below)
Janis, Irving
L. (1972). Victims of Groupthink. New York: Houghton Mifflin.Janis,
Irving L. (1982).
Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes.
Second
Edition. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
Symptoms of
Groupthink
Janis has documented
eight symptoms of groupthink:
- Illusion of
invulnerability –Creates excessive optimism that encourages taking extreme
risks.- Collective
rationalization – Members discount warnings and do not reconsider their
assumptions.- Belief in inherent
morality – Members believe in the rightness of their cause and therefore
ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions.- Stereotyped views
of out-groups – Negative views of “enemy” make effective responses to
conflict seem unnecessary.- Direct pressure on
dissenters – Members are under pressure not to express arguments against any
of the group’s views.- Self-censorship –
Doubts and deviations from the perceived group consensus are not expressed.- Illusion of
unanimity – The majority view and judgments are assumed to be unanimous.- Self-appointed
‘mindguards’ – Members protect the group and the leader from information
that is problematic or contradictory to the group’s cohesiveness, view,
and/or decisions.
When the above
symptoms exist in a group that is trying to make a decision, there is a
reasonable chance that groupthink will happen, although it is not necessarily
so. Groupthink occurs when groups are highly cohesive and when they are under
considerable pressure to make a quality decision. When pressures for
unanimity seem overwhelming, members are less motivated to realistically
appraise the alternative courses of action available to them. These group
pressures lead to carelessness and irrational thinking since groups
experiencing groupthink fail to consider all alternatives and seek to maintain
unanimity. Decisions shaped by groupthink have low probability of achieving
successful outcomes.
Examples of
Groupthink: Past and Present
Examples of groupthink
“fiascoes” studied by Janis include US failures to anticipate the attack on
Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the escalation of Vietnam war, and the
ill-fated hostage rescue in Iran. Current examples of groupthink can be found
in the decisions of the Bush administration and Congress to pursue an invasion
of Iraq based on a policy of “preemptive use of military force against
terrorists and rogue nations”. The decision to rush to war in Iraq before a
broad-based coalition of allies could be built has placed the US in an
unenviable military situation in Iraq that is costly in terms of military
deaths and casualties, diplomatic standing in the world, and economically.
Groupthink and the
News Media
Knowledge is power and
we as citizens and as a nation are becoming less powerful. We face an
administration that believes in operating under high levels of secrecy. The
American press, especially the television news media, has let down the
American people and the American people have allowed this to happen. US
television news is geared more toward providing entertainment than
information. When one compares the news Americans received about the “war on
terrorism” and “war in Iraq” with the news citizens of other countries
received, it is easy to see why many Americans were eager to launch an attack
on Saddam Hussein while most of the world thought this was not a good idea.
The major news networks eagerly voiced almost exclusively the Bush
administration’s (questionable) justifications for the attack on Iraq and
ignored the voices of millions who knew that other ways of addressing the
issues were still possible. Furthermore, the rapid pace of CNN, MSNBC, and
Fox News opinion programs makes it difficult for viewers to process
information in any depth. Americans need a press that serves as a devil’s
advocate to alleviate the ongoing groupthink concerning the war on terrorism
and the invasion of Iraq.
Review the following
consequences of groupthink and consider how many of them apply to the Bush
administration’s handling of the ‘war on terrorism’ and the issues related to
Iraq and Saddam Hussein:
a) incomplete survey of alternatives
b) incomplete survey of objectives
c) failure to examine risks of preferred choice
d) failure to reappraise initially rejected alternatives
e) poor information search
f) selective bias in processing information at hand
g) failure to work out contingency plans
h) low probability of successful outcome
Remedies for
Groupthink
Decision experts have
determined that groupthink may be prevented by adopting some of the following
measures:
a) The leader should assign the role of critical evaluator to each
member
b) The leader should avoid stating preferences and expectations at the
outset
c) Each member of the group should routinely discuss the groups’
deliberations with a trusted associate and report back to the group on the
associate’s reactions
d) One or more experts should be invited to each meeting on a staggered
basis. The outside experts should be encouraged to challenge views of the
members.
e) At least one articulate and knowledgeable member should be given the
role of devil’s advocate (to question assumptions and plans)
f) The leader should make sure that a sizeable block of time is set
aside to survey warning signals from rivals; leader and group construct
alternative scenarios of rivals’ intentions.
Books
Hart, P. (1994).
Government: A study of small groups and policy failure. Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University
Press
In the first book-length
study of groupthink since Janis’s work, Paul ‘t Hart has provided a rigorous
and systematic version of this influential theory which opens several new
avenues for research. Groupthink in government examines the circumstances
most likely to produce or counteract groupthink, and applies the theory to
issues such as leadership style, risk taking, accountability, and
prevention. ‘t Hart’s elaborate case study of the Iran-Contra scandal
demonstrates the continuing relevance of the groupthink theory in the
examination of flawed decision making.Janis, I.L. (1972).
Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of foreign policydecisions and fiascoes.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Janis defines groupthink as
the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses
disagreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive
decision-making groups. In this, the first edition, Janis showed how this
phenomenon contributed to some of the major U.S. foreign policy fiascoes of
recent decades: the Korean War stalemate, the escalation of the Vietnam War,
the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of
Pigs blunder. He also examined cases, such as the handling of the Cuban
Missile Crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, where GROUPTHINK
was avoided.Janis, I.L. (1982).
Groupthink: A psychological study of policy decisions and fiascoes.Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company.
In this edition (2nd),
Janis applies his hypothesis to the Watergate cover-up, portraying in detail
how GROUPTHINK helped to put the participants on a disastrous course and
keep them there. In addition, he presents some new ideas on how & why
GROUPTHINK occurs, and offers suggestions for avoiding it.
Kowert, P.A. (2002).
Groupthink or deadlock: When do leaders learn from theiradvisors? Albany:
Blackwell Publishing.
This book argues that too
much advice can lead to policy deadlock depending on leadership style. The
danger of groupthink is now standard fare in leadership training programs
and a widely accepted explanation, among political scientists, for
policy-making fiascoes. Efforts to avoid groupthink, however, can lead to an
even more serious problem-deadlock. Groupthink or Deadlock explores these
dual problems in the Eisenhower and Reagan administrations and demonstrates
how both presidents were capable of learning and consequently changing their
policies, sometimes dramatically, but at the same time doing so in
characteristically different ways. Kowert points to the need for leaders to
organize their staff in a way that fits their learning and leadership style
and allows them to negotiate a path between groupthink and deadlock.
Journal
Articles
Ahlfinger, N. R. & Esser, J. K. (2001). Testing
the groupthink model: Effects of
promotional leadership and conformity predisposition.
Social Behavior &
Personality: An International Journal, 29(1), 31-42.
This
article discusses two hypotheses that were derived from groupthink theory and
were tested in a laboratory study which included measures of the full range of
symptoms of groupthink, symptoms of a poor decision process, and decision
quality. The hypothesis that groups composed of members who were indisposed to
conform would be more likely to fall victim to groupthink than groups whose
members were no predisposed to conform received no support. It is suggested
that groupthink research is hampered by measurement problems.
<![if !supportLineBreakNewLine]>
<![endif]>Esser, J.K. (1998). Alive and
well after 25 years: A review of groupthink research.Organizational
Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 73(2-3), 116-141.
This
article provides a summary of empirical research on groupthink theory.
Groupthink research, analyses of historical cases of poor group decision
making are included, and laboratory tests are reviewed. Results from these two
research areas are briefly compared. Theoretical and methodological issues for
future groupthink research is identified and discussed.
Fuller, S.R. & Aldag, R.J.
(1998). Organizational Tonypandy: Lessons from a quarter
century of the groupthink phenonmenon.
Organizational Behavior & Human
Decision Processes, 73(2-3),
163-184.
In
this paper, Fuller and Aldag argue that the quarter-century experience with
groupthink represents an unfortunate episode in the history of group problem
solving research. There has been remarkably little empirical support for the
groupthink phenomenon, and that the phenomenon rests on arguable assumptions,
that published critiques of groupthink have generally been ignored by
groupthink researchers, and that groupthink is presented as fact in journal
articles and textbooks. They see continued advocacy of groupthink as a form of
organizational Tonypandy, in which knowledgeable individuals fail to “speak
out” against widely accepted, but erroneous beliefs. They explore the nature
and causes of the Tonypandy and encourage researchers to cast off the
artificial determinism and constraints of the groupthink model, and instead,
seek to inform the general group decision making literature.
Kramer, R.M. (1998).
Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam decisions 25 years later:
How well has the groupthink hyposthesis stood the test of
time? Organizational
Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 73(2-3),
236-271.
This
paper explains how in the twenty five years since the groupthink hypothesis
was first formulated, new evidence, including recently declassified documents,
rich oral histories, and informative memoirs by key participants in these
fiasco decisions have become available to scholars. This casts a new light on
the decision making process behind both the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam. Much of
the new evidence does not support Janis’s original characterization of these
processes. In particular, it suggests that dysfunctional group dynamics
stemming from group members’ strivings to maintain group cohesiveness were not
as prominent a causal factor in the deliberation process as Janis argued.
Viewed in aggregate, this new evidence suggests that the groupthink hypothesis
overstates the influence of small group dynamics, while understating the role
political considerations played in these decisions.
Hart, P. (1998). Preventing
groupthink revisited: Evaluating and reforming groups in
government. Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 73(2-3),
306-326.
This
article critically examines Janis’s recommendations for preventing groupthink
in high-level policymaking. It puts forward three models of small group
functioning in government, each of which highlights different dimensions of
collegial policymaking and distinct criteria for evaluating group performance.
Each model also inspires different proposals for groupthink prevention and
improvement of group performance in general. The article concludes with an
agenda for increasing the policy relevance and practical feasibility of
research on political decision groups.
McCauley, C. (1998). Group
dynamics in Janis’s Theory of groupthink: Backward and
forward. Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 73(2-3),
142-162.
This
paper traces groupthink to its theoretical roots in order to suggest how a
broader and a more consistent use of research in group dynamics can advance
understanding of decision-making problems. In particular, the paper explores
and reinterprets the groupthink prediction that poor decision- making is most
likely when group cohesion is based on the personal attractiveness of group
members.
Moorhead, G., Neck, C.P. &
West, M.S. (1998) The tendency toward defective decision
making within self-managing teams: The relevance of groupthink
for the 21st
century. Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 73(2-3),
327-351.
Groupthink theory has continued relevance to organizations because of the
organizational trend toward self-managing work teams. A typology is developed
linking the key differentiating characteristics of self-managing teams to
groupthink antecedents of group cohesion, structural faults of the
organization, and provocative situational context. Building upon this
framework, we more specifically examine variables that will impact the
occurrence of groupthink within self-managing teams. Implications for the
prevention of groupthink in self-managing teams are discussed.
Paulus, P.B. (1998).
Developing consensus about groupthink after all these years.Organizational
Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 73(2-3), 362-374.
In
the context of these papers of this special issue, the models of groupthink
are evaluated. The major focus is on the basis for its impact and its
scientific status. The groupthink perspective is seen as consistent with some
other contributions to the group’s literature. Interesting parallels between
the groupthink and the brainstorming literature are noted. It is conclude that
many of the issues raised by the groupthink model are worthy of further
examination in a broad-based study of group decision processes.
Peterson, R.S., Owens, R.D.,
Tetlock, P.E., Fan, E.T. & Martorana, P. (1998). Group
dynamics in the top management teams: Groupthink, vigilance, and alternative
models of organizational failure and success.
Organizational Behavior & Human
Decision Processes, 73(2-3),
272-305.
This
study explored the heuristic value of Janis’ (1982) groupthink and vigilant
decision-making models as explanations of failure and success in top
management team decision making using the Organizational Group Dynamics Q-sort
(GDQ). Top management teams of seven Fortune 500 companies were examined at
two historical junctures—one when the team was successful (defined as
satisfying strategic constituencies) and one when the team was unsuccessful.
Results strongly supported the notion that a group’s decision-making process
is systematically related to the outcomes experienced by the team. The results
illustrate the usefulness of the GDQ for developing and empirically testing
theory in organizational behavior from historical cases.
Raven, B.H. (1998).
Groupthink, Bay of Pigs, and Watergate reconsidered.Organizational
Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 73(2-3), 352-361.
In
this paper, Raven argues that group decisions have often been seen as offering
the benefits of collective wisdom, but may also lead to disastrous
consequences. Groupthink then focuses on the negative effects of erroneous
group decisions, the two major examples being the disastrous Bay of Pigs,
which then led to the Watergate scandal. While Janis seems to suggest that
groupthink will ultimately lead the group to fail in its ultimate endeavors,
we need to consider the frightening possibility that in the case of the Nixon
group, the group actions came close to being successful.
Schwartz, J. & Wald, M. L.
(2003, March 03). Smart people working collectively can be
dumber than the sum of their brains: “Groupthink”is 30 years old, and still
going
strong. NY Times. Retrieved February 20, 2004, from Ebsco database.
This
issue came into sharp focus in Houston in 2003 at the first public hearing of
the board investigating the Columbia disaster last month. Reprinted at:
http://www.mindfully.org/Reform/2003/Smart-People-Dumber9mar03.htm.
Street, M. D. & Anthony, W.
P. (1997). A conceptual framework establishing the
relationship between groupthink and escalating commitment.
Small Group
Research, 28(2), 267-294.
This
article presents three propositions designed to demonstrate a theoretical
relationship between the groupthink and escalation commitment models.
Proposition that groups exhibiting groupthink characteristics are more likely
to escalate commitment to a losing course of action than are groups not
exhibiting groupthink characteristics.
<![if !supportLineBreakNewLine]>
<![endif]>Turner, M. E. & Pratkanis, A.
R. (1998). Twenty-five years of groupthink theory and
research: Lessons from the evaluation of a theory.
Organizational Behavior &
Human Decision Processes, 73(2-3),
105-115. Retrieved January 20, 2004, fromEbsco
database.
This
is from a special issue on theoretical perspectives of groupthink, a
twenty-fifth anniversary appraisal. The article examines the historical
development of the groupthink model of decision-making processes and discusses
recent responses to the body of empirical evidence amassed on the model. The
article concludes by articulating general lessons implied by the evolution of
research on the groupthink model.
Whyte, G. (1998). Recasting
Janis’s groupthink model: The key role of collective
efficacy in decision fiascoes.
Organizational Behavior & Human Decision
Processes, 73(2-3), 185-209.
This
paper advances an explanation for decision fiascoes that reflects recent
theoretical trends and was developed in response to a growing body of research
that has failed to substantiate the groupthink model (Janis, 1982). In this
new framework, the lack of vigilance and preference for risk that
characterizes groups contaminated by groupthink are attributed in large part
to perceptions of collective efficacy that unduly exceed capability. High
collective efficacy may also contribute to the negative framing of decisions
and to certain administrative and structural organizational faults. In the
making of critical decisions, these factors induce a preference for risk and a
powerful concurrence seeking tendency that, facilitated by group polarization,
crystallize around a decision option that is likely to fail. Implications for
research and some evidence in support of this approach to the groupthink
phenomenon are also discussed.
Web Sites
Groupthink Central:
http://www.groupthinkcentral.blogspot.com/
This website is for groupthink central, and has the following
quote by Walter Reuther.
“There is no greater calling than to serve your fellow men. There is no
greater contribution than to help the weak. There is no greater satisfaction
than to have done it well.” —
A First Look at
Communication Theory:
http://www.afirstlook.com/main.htm
This
website is primarily designed as a companion to communication theory by Em
Griffin and the Instructor’s Manual by Glen McClish, and Jacqueline Bacon.
This site includes links to resource materials for texts, and a description of
Conversations with communication theorists, a video of the interviews
conducted with the authors of a number of theories featured in the book. Links
to theories in the current (5th) edition can be found, as well as
theories in the archives of past editions.
Chapter 18 by Irving Janis, in the book A First Look at Communication
Theory (1997), by Em Griffin
http://www.afirstlook.com/archive/groupthink.cfm?source=archther..In
this chapter, Janis discusses the events behind the Challenger disaster, as a
model of defective decision-making. He describes the mode of thinking and how
people in a cohesive group have a tendency to seek concurrence with others in
the group to finalize their decisions. The chapter outlines the eight symptoms
of groupthink, and offers a critique on avoiding uncritical acceptance of
groupthink.
Errors and Accidents:
Groupthink
http://www.ess.ntu.ac.uk/miller/error/groupthink.htm#linking.
This
BSc Psychology website developed by Hugh Miller and Bill Farnsworth at the
Nottingham Trent University offers chapters on Groupthink by Irving Janis and
others.
Argos Press GROUPTHINK Risk Management and Decision Making
Glossary:
http://www.risk-management.argospress.com/groupt.htm.This website is a glossary to risk management and
decision making, systems thinking, and situation awareness. This site has a
comprehensive glossary of utility terms and a Peer Tool that can be ordered
free online to guide the group towards making better decisions.