

DISMANTLING THE MASK OF ENMITY

AN EDUCATIONAL RESOURCE MANUAL ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENEMY IMAGES

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An exaggerated, literally diabolical image of another country—a country that is actually composed of human beings not so very different from the citizens of one's own country—is in my judgment the very taproot of war in the present-day world.

Ralph K. White, Ph.D.
Author of Fearful Warriors

The challenge to those of us who set a very high priority on moving towards peace is to induce more of our colleagues and our fellow citizens to agree with us—and to bring our skills and resources to bear as psychologists and citizens without any invitation from the government and without the support of a national consensus.

M. Brewster Smith, Ph.D.
Kurt Lewin Memorial Address, 1986

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Finally, thanks are due to the many people who are using this Manual and who will apply their own art and sensitivity to educate effectively, helping us to deal responsibly with images of the enemy.

Introduction

Peacemakers often work on reducing weaponry, an essential step toward security. But building a lasting peace requires that we change not only our weapons but also our ways of thinking. Just as we need to dismantle weapons, so too do we need to dismantle the enemy images that limit our thinking about security and that fuel tensions and wars. One of the best ways of dismantling enemy images is through education that analyzes the psychology of enemy images, that engages us in experiential learning about our own hidden biases and assumptions about our enemies, and that increases our awareness of and resistance to the harmful effects of enemy images.

Psychologists for Social Responsibility designed this Resource Manual for teaching college and high school students and for educating the public about the psychological processes that underlie enemy images and their diverse effects. The term *enemy image* refers to the distortions or exaggerations that occur when people respond to groups toward which they feel hostility or mistrust. Included in an enemy image are a tendency to perceive the actions of the other group as more hostile than they actually have been and a reluctance to negotiate with the "enemy" in order to reduce the level of conflict. When mutual enemy images are at work among conflicting groups, they reinforce on another, leading each group to increase its own level of preparedness and mistrust in response to similar actions of the other group.

Enemy images can affect any groups, whether they are racial, ethnic, economic, international, etc. Here we focus primarily on the effect of enemy images on international relations, for enemy images of nations have fueled the arms races that continue to be such a threat to physical and economic well being around the world. In addition, enemy images have played major roles in the outbreak of many of the wars that have plagued human history. Although many of the examples used will focus on the mutual enemy images of the United States and the Soviet Union, the processes apply equally to such nations as Japan or the Arab states that may be increasingly treated as enemies in the near future. They also apply to the conflict between racial and ethnic groups that rigger violence worldwide.

Presentations on enemy images may have a variety of goals, The presenter may wish to reduce the distortions and misconceptions regarding particular groups that predispose people to conflict, to increase critical thinking skills and resistance to propaganda, to increase receptiveness to negotiation and conflict resolution, to build empathy skills, to demonstrate the important role played by psychological processes in exacerbating social problems, or to teach psychological principles using material to which many students can relate. The particular set of goals underlying a presentation will define the content and the style of the presentation. To this end, we have organized this guide in a flexible manner, providing teachers with descriptions of research studies, theory, examples from history and from the mass media, and quotes

form world leaders. We also provide suggestions for audience activities and accompanying materials that are useful in bringing presentations alive.

The Manual begins with a section on the cognitive effects of enemy images, showing how our conceptions of a nation as an "enemy" may lead to misperceptions. Although this section focuses on published research, each of the processes dealt with is illustrated by examples from the history and from the mass media. The section is divided into three parts, the first of which concerns general cognitive effects. The second part is devoted specifically to attribution, which has been such an important area in psychology in recent years, and the third part, drawn from Ralph White's book *Fearful Warriors*, deals with misperceptions that may serve emotional needs.

History provides a wealth of case studies on the harmful effects of enemy images, but none is more poignant than that of U.S. -Soviet relations following World War II. As the Cold War recedes, it is essential that we examine the psychology of that era with an eye toward creating new, more peaceful international environment. Accordingly, the second section provides a broad review of U.S. attitudes and cognitions regarding the Soviet Union, bringing together work on enemy images done from cognitive, social, developmental and clinical perspectives. The article includes an extensive bibliography that will allow you to pursue further reading on your own.

The third section deals with enemy images in fiction with a particular emphasis on film. While this section does not deal with basic psychological processes that have been researched in the lab, it demonstrates some of the techniques used to spread enemy images among the public. This material appeals strongly to high school and college students and is often an effective means of getting them involved in discussions of the more basic processes.

Because lectures are not always the most appropriate or effective means of promoting learning, the fourth section presents a variety of activities for enhancing active learning and thought among audiences. Each activity is presented along with a set of goals, an explanation of the procedure, suggestions for discussion, and, where appropriate, handouts for the audience. By choosing activities that are appropriate to your audience, your goals, and your own style of presentation, you may create a rich learning experience that enables the participants to move beyond their own hidden assumptions and enemy images.

The fifth and final section of the Manual is a general overview of the topic of enemy images. This section is useful on its own when preparing talks for non-academic audiences or in combination with the other sections in preparing class lectures. If you are not a psychologist, you will find it useful to read this section first.

Throughout the Manual you will find references to books and articles that may be of use to you. Two general references deserve particular mention. One is Ralph

White's book *Fearful Warriors* and the other is the chapter on "The Image of the Enemy" in Jerome Frank's *Sanity and Survival*.

This Manual will evolve over time, keeping abreast of the rapid changes underway in the international and domestic arena, of changes in the needs and issues of prospective audiences, and of advances in the study and teaching of enemy images. We welcome your feedback and suggestions, which may be sent directly to Brett Silverstein, Department of Psychology, City College of New York, New York, N.Y. 10031. [check for current address]

SECTION I

COGNITIVE EFFECTS OF ENEMY IMAGES

Enemy Images distort our thinking by influencing cognitive processes such as attention, memory, and attribution. The first part of this section examines the ways in which enemy images bias attention and memory, while the second and third parts discuss attribution and motivated misperception, respectively. One way to use the information in the following pages on the cognitive effects of enemy images is to choose some of the ways in which enemy images lead people to view “enemies” in a biased manner and to illustrate each of these using one or two studies and one or two examples from history or from the mass media.

I. Cognitive Biases: Selective Attention and Memory

The effects of enemy images on attention and memory are highlighted and summarized below by means of six propositions.

Proposition 1. Enemy images lead people to selectively attend to and remember negative aspects and actions of “enemies.”

Research

Dutta, Kanungo, and Freidberg (1972) studied English Canadian subjects chosen for their unfavorable attitudes toward French Canadians. When asked to recall a series of pleasant and unpleasant adjectives, they remembered more pleasant adjectives than unpleasant adjectives that had been used to describe French Canadians. Results for French Canadian subjects were reversed.

Levine and Murphy (1943) gave students five weekly fifteen-minute periods to learn each of two short written selections dealing with the Soviet Union. One of the two selections was favorable to the Soviet system while the other was unfavorable. Half of the subjects were pro-communist while the other half were anti-communist. By the end of a five-week forgetting period, the anti-communist subjects remembered significantly more of the anti-Soviet selection and significantly less of the pro-Soviet selection than did the pro-communist subjects.

Flamenbaum and Silverstein (1987) found that compared to students who read a description of actions supposedly taken by Australia, those who read an identical selection about the Soviet Union were more likely to remember aggressive actions.

Application to Mass Media

Kreisberg (1946) sampled the news items dealing with the Soviet Union that appeared in the *New York Times* between 1917 and 1946. He rated each item as either favorable or unfavorable to the Soviet Union. Over 45 weeks sampled in 1917, 1918, and 1935, the more negative the news about the Soviet Union, the more attention it was given.

Proposition 2. Enemy Images lead people to pay attention to and remember criticisms of enemies more than they attend to and remember statements supporting enemies.

Research

Vallone, Ross and Lepper (1985) found that people who favored the Israelis in the Mid-East conflict perceived media coverage of the Beirut massacre as biased against Israel whereas people who favored the Arabs perceived the same coverage as biased against the Arabs.

In the Flamenbaum and Silverstein (1987) study described above, after reading the statement "The Soviet Union [Australia], on the other hand, denies the Chinese countercharges concerning the beaming of radio broadcasts into China," compared to those who read about Australia, the subjects who read the Soviet selection were almost four times as likely to recall the item as saying that the Soviet Union did beam radio broadcasts into China. This indicates that in the United States, Soviet credibility is so low that accusations against the Soviet Union are often processed as fact while statements defending the Soviet Union are often ignored.

Examples

A real-world analogue of this study occurred after the Chernobyl nuclear accident in the Soviet Union in 1986 when accusations of a high death toll resulting from the accident were made by sources ranging from U.S. Secretary of State Shultz to the *New York Post* and a major American press service, (whose wild overestimation of 2000 deaths appeared in many newspapers and newscasts. The Soviet Union denied these accusations and as of this date the Soviet estimate of fewer than 10 deaths is the one that is accepted by most authorities. In a questionnaire dealing with Soviet-American relations, Silverstein and Flamenbaum asked undergraduates at a state university to estimate the number of deaths resulting from the accident during the first week. Only 31% answered 25 or less compared to 42% who answered 500 or greater and 10% of the students surveyed estimated that the number of deaths was greater than 50,000. The majority of students was either not exposed to, or ignored claims regarding the casualties.

Possible Focus for Discussion

An example, which recurs often in the media, of according credibility to accusations against enemies that are based upon little evidence is the description of reform and revolutionary movements in neighboring nations as being sponsored by the enemy. (In the case of the Soviet Union, the nations are usually in Eastern Europe while for the United States the nations are often in Latin America. Can you think of examples of this process? What have been the effects of this process?

The credibility problem is so bad that, in the words of Marshall Shulman (1980), former Special Advisor to the Secretary of State on Soviet Affairs, "There is a risk even in talking about the Soviet perspective. I have found, particularly in Washington, that to do so raises question about whether one is serving as an apologist for the Soviet Union."

Proposition 3. Enemy images lead people to predict hostile behavior from enemies and to act in a hostile manner toward enemies based solely upon this prediction.

Research

Snyder and Swann (1978) set up a competition in which participants could use bursts of uncomfortable noise to punish opponents. Subjects who were told that their opponent was hostile used more loud bursts than other subjects, even before the opponent had had any opportunity to demonstrate hostility by using the noise machine.

Application to Mass Media

Lippmann and Merz (1940) made a study of news of the Soviet Union that appeared in the *New York Times* following the Russian Revolution. They found that despite the extreme weakness of the Soviet Union during the early 1920's that rendered it barely able to continue to function—it had fairly recently suffered more casualties in World War I than in any other nation, undergone two revolutions and was the scene of a major civil war—the *Times* continued to predict hostile actions directed by the Soviet Union against other nations. These predictions, described in such headlines as "Fear that Bolsheviki Will Now Invade Japanese Territory" (2/11/20), "Reds Raising Army to Attack India" (2/7/20) and "Reds Seek War with America" (12/30/19), were eventually found to be quite inaccurate.

In 1956, General Curtis Lemay, then the chief of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, was reported in the May 27 *New York Times* as predicting that "... the Russians would have by 1959 twice as many long-range bombers as the United States." In fact, the United States has never fallen behind the Soviet Union in long-range members and has even maintained a lead as large as 5-1 (Kaplan, 1983). It is likely that the U.S. build up its bomber fleet based upon the prediction that the Soviet Union would do the same (as in the Snyder and Swann study).

On February 23, 1959, *Time* magazine reported that U.S. Secretary of Defense McElroy predicted that by the early 1960's the U.S. would be behind the Soviets in intercontinental ballistic missiles by 3-to-1. Coincidentally, 17 years later, on March 8, 1976, the same magazine reported in another article containing predictions of threatening Soviet actions, entitled "That Alarming Soviet Buildup," that in 1965 the Soviet Union had 224 ICBMs to the 854 of the United States. Again, predictions of threatening actions by the enemy had been exaggerated.

Possible Focus for Discussion

Despite past errors, new predictions of threat continue to be made, as witness the recent use of hypothetical chemical weapons, biological weapons, and satellite weapons gaps to justify the U.S. buildup of these weapons. What predictions of threats form such enemies as the Arab states, Japan, drug lords, are being made today? Do you think that these too may be exaggerated?

Proposition 4. Enemy images lead people to exaggerate the level of hostility of enemy actions compared to similar actions performed by non-enemies.

Research

Duncan (1976) showed white undergraduates videotape depicting either a black or white person ambiguously shoving another person. The shove was labeled as more violent when it had been administered by a black person than when it had been administered by a white person.

Oskamp (1964; 1968; Oskamp and Hartry, 1968; see also Mickolus, 1980) has performed several studies that demonstrate that his process affects American evaluations of Soviet actions. He made up a list of actions, belligerent and conciliatory, that had been taken by both the United States and the Soviet Union. The actions were described without reference to specific places, dates, or details so that they covered both the countries' actions. He then made two versions of the list. In one

he filled in the name of the Soviet Union in the same list of items. For example, one item read "The head of the (U.S. or U.S.S.R.) has publicly denied any intentions to conquer the territories of other nations" while another read "The (U.S. or U.S.S.R.) has established rocket bases close to the borders of (the other nation)"/" Students were then asked to read one of the lists and indicate how favorably they viewed each of the actions. Students were much less favorable to the actions of the Soviet Union than to the same actions when they were ascribed to the United States.

Examples

An historical analogue of this study occurred in 1955, when the Soviets submitted a disarmament proposal to the subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament commission. The proposal was strikingly similar to one submitted earlier by the British and French. Instead of appreciating that the Soviets were willing to go along with a Western Proposal, James J. Wadsworth, the head of the U.S. delegation (as reported in the *New York Times* on May 21) "... conceded that some parts of the Soviet proposal were reproduced in the identical language previously used by the West, but declared that "sometimes words mean different things" to the Soviet Union and to the Western powers."

Application to Mass Media

Herman (1982) tallied the coverage given by the *New York Times* to dissidents in various nations. Between January, 1975 and July, 1981 Soviet dissidents Alexander Ginzburg, Anatoly Scharansky and Andrei Sakharav were mentioned in the Times 68, 138, and 223 times respectively whereas Archbishop Camara, a church leader from Brazil, Jose Luis Massara, a noted mathematician from Uruguay and Heri Akhmadi, a student leader in Indonesia, all of whom are major dissident figures in nations allied with the United Nations, were mentioned 4, 5, and 0 times respectively. One labor leader, Lech Walesa of Poland, was mentioned 81 times whereas another important leader, Luis Silva of Brazil, was mentioned 3 times.

Possible Focus for Discussion

These differences may result from Biases on the part of the reporters or the editors of the Times or from their belief that the American public has no interest in Brazilian or Indonesian dissidents. (An interest on the part of the public often results from media attention, however, the process may be circular.) In either case, Americans are often exposed to messages from people who are criticizing the Soviet Union. Do you think that it would be a good idea to allow spokespeople for such groups as the PLO and FOR such nations as Libya or Cuba to present their ideas to the American public in the mass media?

From October 23 to October 25, 1962 the *New York Times* ran 21 articles about the Cuban missile crisis and the *Washington Post* ran 37 articles. While the articles mentioned the threat posed by the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba, fewer than one-quarter of the articles in either newspaper reported that the United States already had nuclear missiles in Turkey, which lies directly on the Soviet border. The placement of this information, when it did appear, further downplayed its importance. Of the 140 front-page paragraphs in *New York Times* articles that mentioned the Soviet Weapons in Cuba during that three-day period, only three made any mention of the American missiles. All three of these paragraphs appeared in a single article on the bottom of the column. People who read only the first few paragraphs of articles and those who read only the front page and happened to overlook that one article did not learn that the Soviets had a reason to feel that U.S. missiles in Turkey might justify a reaction including the placement of missiles near the U.S. border.

Many of those articles noting that the United States had threatened the Soviet Union with nearby missiles before the Soviets returned the threat did so just to downplay the U.S. threat. For example the *Washington Post* on October 24 reported that "...it was the Soviet threat to Western Europe that led to our arming the Turks and Italians with certain nuclear weapons... Cuba is obviously not under the threat of ...any attack at all by this country. The missiles in Turkey and Italy are defensive... whereas the Soviet Weapons in Cuba have altered the status quo between the world's two major power blocs." What makes this statement so interesting is not just that it obviously applied a double standard to U.S. and Soviet actions but that Cuban expatriates organized by the American C.I.A. had attempted (albeit unsuccessfully) an invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs just 18 months previously.

Proposition 5. Enemy Images encourage ignorance about enemies.

Several studies have demonstrated that Americans are uninformed about the Soviet Union. Plous and Zimbardo (1984) found that readers of *Psychology Today* were unable to differentiate between the unlabeled actions of the United States and the Soviet Union. (This finding can also be interpreted as demonstrating that the actions of the two nations have been quite similar.)

In a study based on balance theory, Hirshberg and Livingston (1988) found that among a sample of college students, those who considered both the Soviet Union and Iran to be "bad" were significantly more likely than the others to incorrectly believe that the relationship between the two nations was positive. This finding may help to explain why, in the absence of evidence, many Americans continue to associate the Soviet Union with a variety of "bad" actions, ranging from drug smuggling to terrorism. For example, 28% of the respondents to a survey published in the *New York Times* on November 10, 1985 believed that during World War II the Soviet Union fought *against* the United States and 24% of the students surveyed at

three colleges thought that the Soviets first invented the atomic bomb, 50% incorrectly believed the Soviets invented multiple warheads and 55% incorrectly believed they invented cruise missiles (Hunter, Flamenbaum, Yatani & Silverstein, 1985).

In addition to resulting from the cognitive biases inherent in enemy images, ignorance may also exacerbate them. For example, the ignorance of the great losses suffered by the Soviets as a result of invasion and war may underlie the tendency of Americans to underemphasize Soviet feelings of defensiveness in attributing motivations for aggressive Soviet behavior (Hirschberg, 1988). Most of the undergraduates surveyed by Silverstein and Flamenbaum (1989) greatly underestimated the number of Soviet people who died during World War II. Whereas the generally accepted figure is about 20 million, 26 percent estimated less than 20,000.

Proposition 6. Enemy images lead to biases in the ways in which motives are attributed for the positive and negative actions of enemies. (See the next section)

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II. Attributing Motives for the Actions of Enemies

Selections from the PsySR Report to the United Nations (June, 1988)

Enemy images have been found by psychologists to distort the process of attributing the motivations of nations in three ways:

1. When nations assumed to be enemies perform actions that might be considered hostile, people tend to underemphasize or ignore the situational pressures experienced by the "enemy." As a result, they view the actions as proof that the enemy is hostile or barbaric.

2. When nations assumed to be enemies perform actions that might be considered to be peaceful, people tend to overemphasize the situational processes experienced by the enemy. As a result, they see the actions as forced upon the enemy by circumstances and not as evidence that the enemy truly desires peace. Thus, apparently hostile acts do more to strengthen enemy images than apparently peaceful acts do to dispel them.

3. When enemy images are powerful enough apparently peaceful actions of adversaries may be attributed to hostile motives. Thus, a peace proposal may be viewed as crass propaganda, an attempt to increase tensions among allies, or a trick to allow enemies to maintain or increase military superiority.

Research

Taylor and Jaggi (1974) provided evidence regarding the first two of these processes. They gave short descriptions to Hindu office clerks in southern India of either a Moslem or a Hindu behaving in friendly or unfriendly ways in various situations and asked the subjects to choose the major reason that the person in the description behaved as he or she did. The Hindu subjects in the study ascribed the friendly behaviors of the Hindu characters in the story to their personalities and the unfriendly behaviors to circumstances. For the Moslem characters the results were reversed. Their unfriendly behaviors were ascribed to personality dispositions and their friendly behaviors were ascribed to the situation.

Burn and Oskamp (1989) and Sande, Goethals and Ferrari (1989) have recently demonstrated that all three of these processes may affect U.S. interpretations of Soviet actions. Burn and Oskamp provided U.S. college students with a list of Soviet actions including an apparently peaceful action, the 1985 moratorium on nuclear testing, as well as apparently hostile actions, such as the downing of the Korean Airlines Flight 007. They found that when asked to attribute motivations for the actions listed, about 60 percent of the subjects in their study tended to choose the most negative motivations, whether they actions appeared to be peaceful or not.

Sande, Goethals and Ferrari (1989) did a similar study using fictional situations such as the shipment of arms, in one case, and the sending of aid, in another, to an African nation. Although the actions were fictional, the student subjects thought that they had actually occurred. The use of the fictional situations allowed Sande et al. to determine that in attributing motivations for the action, U.S. students chose more negative motives when the actions were supposedly performed by the Soviet Union than when the actions were supposedly performed by the United States or by France. This demonstrates that biases do affect U.S. attributions of both positive and negative Soviet actions and that the biases are more anti-Soviet than pro-United States. Furthermore, Canadian students did not attribute more negative motivations to the Soviet Union than to the United States.

These processes may also affect government leaders. Holsti (1986) for example, analyzed all of the public statements dealing with the Soviet Union made by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles between 1953 and 1959. He coded these statements into 3,584 assertions that were placed into one of four categories: (1) Assessments of the friendship or hostility exemplified by Soviet actions. (2) Evaluations of the Soviet Union on a good-bad dimension. (3) Assessments of the strength or weakness of Soviet capabilities. (4) Assessments of the success or failure of Soviet foreign policy. He divided the data into twelve six-month periods. He found no relationship between the assessments of the hostility exemplified by Soviet actions and the evaluations of the Soviet Union, whereas the relationships between these hostility assessments and the assessments of Soviet weakness and failure were strong. That is, during those periods when Dulles perceived Soviet actions as not very hostile, he did not change his overall evaluation of the Soviet Union but he did perceive the Soviet Union as weaker and less successful.

Koopman, Snyder and Jervis (1989) had a sample of subscribers to the journal *International Security* that included academic experts as well as government advisors respond to scenarios describing hypothetical situations in which the Soviet Union sent military forces into Iran. Varying the circumstances of the scenarios, such as the balance of conventional or nuclear forces, or more relevant to this report, the likelihood that the Soviets were acting in response to a perceived threat, had very little effect on the policy recommendations made by the respondents in the study. That is, the elite respondents surveyed in this study essentially ignored the evidence regarding possible situational pressures leading the Soviet Union to act in an apparently hostile manner. What did predict the recommendations were the initial beliefs held by the respondents regarding the Soviet Union and the U.S.–Soviet relations.

Examples

All three of the processes discussed here have influenced U.S. responses to Soviet actions. The first process, wherein the situational pressures motivating apparently hostile acts are ignored, played a major role in the U.S. responses to the downing by the Soviet Union of a civilian Korean airliner in 1983. While American leaders and the American press treated the event as evidence of Soviet barbarism, they paid little attention to several facts that eventually surfaced: At the outset of World War II, the Nazis destroyed nearly half of the Soviet air force on the ground, in part accomplished because of reconnaissance they had made from the air (White, 1984). The United States had a history of using spy planes for reconnaissance over the Soviet Union. A U.S. RC-135 spy plane had been spotted in the area earlier that day and, contrary to early U.S. allegations, pilots have concluded that it is quite possible to mistake an airliner like the KAL for an RC-135. The Soviet pilot shot down the plane only after following recognized international procedure in trying to warn the plane to land.

These facts do not justify the downing of the airliner but they are important aspects of the situational pressures experienced by the Soviets when they decided to shoot down the plane. Ignoring such pressures or underestimating their importance may originate from an enemy image and probably helps to reinforce that image.

The second process, whereby apparently peaceful acts are viewed as being forced by circumstances upon the enemy was exemplified in the *New York Times*' 1982 response to Soviet actions. On September 27, 1982, the *Times*, one of the most respected newspapers in the United States, quoted the analysis of recent Soviet international activity made by a "State Department" expert." Here is what the expert said:

There's a lot of talk here that the Soviets won't stand in the way of getting the Cubans out of Angola. They could have been much more obstreperous in Lebanon. They've shown restraint in their arms shipments to Central America. They could have done more in Poland. And they haven't escalated in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan no longer looks like the first step in a grand strategic drive.

In analyzing the cause of such behavior, the article did not mention the possibility that the Soviet Union might have been trying to be peaceful. Instead, the newspaper attributed the apparently pacifistic behavior of the Soviet Union to "a kind of creeping paralysis in Soviet decision-making that has led to an essentially passive world posture."

The third process, whereby apparently peaceful acts are attributed to hostile motivations, was evident in 1956, when the Soviet Union offered to follow a plan suggested by the British and French and limit its troops to 1,500,000 if the United States would do the same. The Soviet offer of March 28, 1956 to cut its troops would appear to have been a move towards peace. But the response made by U.S. Secretary of State Jon Foster Dulles appeared in the *Times* on May 16: "...Mr. Dulles went on, however, to point out that by releasing uniformed soldiers and airmen into industry and agriculture the Soviet Union might increase its war making power." When asked if he would have preferred that the Soviets keep the men in the armed forces, Dulles replied "Well, it's a fair conclusion that I would rather have them standing around doing guard duty than making atomic bombs."

And on April 8, 1985, when Soviet Premier Gorbachev announced a six month unilateral freeze of the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe, the *Times* reported that the proposal "seemed to officials here designed to cause dissension in NATO and undercut American interests in Europe." Similarly, the unilateral nuclear test ban announced by the Soviet Union in 1985 was treated by the U.S. leadership and media as simple propaganda.

These psychological effects of enemy images act as barriers to peace in several ways. They all result in even stronger enemy images. IN addition, the first process is particularly dangerous during periods of heightened international tension when an incident such as the sinking of a ship or the downing of a plane can rapidly create "war fever." Finally, the third process is a powerful barrier to peacemaking when one nation that is a party to a conflict (or a participant in an arms race) makes an offer to dispel tensions (or slow the arms race) that is treated as a threat by another nation. As a result, communications and attempts at negotiation are blocked and some of the best opportunities for peacemaking are missed.

Ignorance

Psychologists have studied several aspects of the process of attributing motives for the actions of others. One that deserves particular attention in the context of international relations is the role of ignorance. It is difficult for people to take into account the situational pressures experienced by a nation in a particular situation if they are unaware of all the actions of the nation in the situation or of the reasons put forward by the nation for its actions. It is difficult for people to views an apparently hostile action performed by a nation as being motivated by defensive considerations if they are unaware of previous situations that the nation might have been involved in that may influence the responses of that nation. It is difficult for people to overcome their enemy images and be open to peace gestures by a nation if they are unaware of earlier gestures of peace made by the nation or of earlier situations in which the nation worked cooperatively with their own nation.

Unfortunately, such lack of the Soviet Union is quite common in the United States. Twenty eight percent of the respondents to a 1985 survey made by the *New York Times* reported that they believed that during World War II the Soviet Union fought against, not with, the United States. One survey of college students (Silverstein and Flamenbaum, 1989) found that 26 percent of the respondents believed that fewer than 20,000 Soviets died during World War II (rather than the generally accepted figure of about 20 millions Soviet casualties). The same survey found that 48 percent of the respondents were unaware that the Soviet pilot who shot down the Korean airliner had attempted to contact the plane before firing on it. The missing knowledge would appear to be crucial if the citizens of the United States are to accurately assess the motivations of the Soviet Union.

See also above for the discussion of Proposition 5 regarding enemy images and ignorance.

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III. Motivated Misperceptions

Some misperceptions that influence relations between groups appear to be due to subconscious motives. The following descriptions of some such misperceptions provide useful background information that may shape your own thinking about enemy images. The descriptions are taken from Ralph White's 1984 book *Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of U.S. – Soviet Relations* published by Free Press.

BAD GUYS IMAGERY

Often intelligent people, many of them liberal on domestic issues and normally skeptical of the rightness of their government's foreign policies, relax their skepticism when it comes to accepting the conventional wisdom with regard to the implacable aggressiveness of the Soviet rules.

...The more evil and the more powerful and threatening the enemy can be made to seem, the better. It is only then that the righteousness and the virility of the hero and his inevitable ultimate triumph can fully stand out in contrast... I would call this macho pride.

...The other [reason], in my judgment, lies in the satisfaction of feeling more grimly “realistic” about an enemy than others are.

There is nothing wrong or conducive to misperception in getting satisfaction from feeling realistic. That is an appropriate reward and reinforcement for being realistic. There is often something conducive to misperception though (and akin to macho pride) in feeling more grimly realistic than other people... For some reason, though, many people apparently assume that there is something hard, virile, and automatically realistic about totally condemning an outgroup that their own group condemns and putting the worst possible interpretation on anything it does.

A MORAL SELF-IMAGE

...Probably no modern nation (including Germany and Japan) that was embarking on what its neighbors regarded as aggression has talked about it in those terms or even, apart from some lone dissenters, seemed to wonder whether that was what it was doing. The process of rationalization, when most of the members of a group join in reinforcing each other’s rationalizations, is obvious and powerful in defending their collective Good Guys image.

There is also a fairly obvious reason for rationalization: a need to think well of one’s own group, at least in comparison with others. Group pride is a gratifying thing, and by various psychological ego-serving devices (rationalization, project denial, selective inattention) groups usually succeed in achieving it.

THE “PRO-US” ILLUSION

Another war-promoting misperception, much less often recognized than the two that have just been discussed, can be called the “pro-us” illusion and can be defined as the tendency to perceive others as more friendly to one’s own country—or less hostile—than they actually are...

The following examples will give substance to the idea:

Hitler in 1939 greatly underestimated the massive shift of British and French opinion against him which had just occurred as a result of his takeover of the Czech part of Czechoslovakia, breaking the promises he had made at Munich. He therefore imagined he could get away with his attack on Poland without having to fight a major war. He was wrong...

President Kennedy and his chief advisors appear to have half-expected that a landing at the Bay of Pigs would touch off a popular pro-American rebellion in Cuba against Castro. It did not. And they should have known better. State Department intelligence, under Roger Hilsman, knew better, and the last honest opinion poll in Cuba... had indicated a considerable majority favoring Castro at that time...

The “pro-us” illusion evidently takes several forms: underestimating the chance that certain potential opponents will become actual opponents and therefore initiating a war in a spirit of overconfidence (Hitler in 1939); underestimating the tenacity and fighting spirit of an actual or expected opponent (Japan in 1941); believing that the people in an opposing country are more acutely discontented and in a more revolutionary mood than they are (the United States and Cuba in 1961, the Bolshevik leaders and the rest of Europe in 1917-20, the West and the USSR for many years thereafter); and believing that that a rebellion in some other country—a rebellion opposed to one’s own interests—is less formidable and has less popular support than it does (the United States in Vietnam,...the Soviets in Afghanistan)...

OVERLAPPING TERRITORIAL SELF IMAGES

The surface of the earth is dotted with ulcerous spots that have been the source of exorbitant amounts of bad blood and, often, war: Alsace-Lorraine, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Polish Corridor, the Sudetenland, Danzig, the West Bank and Gaza, Israel itself, the Sinai, Lebanon, Cyprus, Kashmir, Bangladesh, South Korea, South Vietnam, Taiwan, Quemoy, Laos, Cambodia, the Sino-Indian border, the Maritime provinces of Siberia, Berlin, Northern Ireland, the Ogbaden, the Shatt-el-Arab, the Falklands/Malvinas. Each of these ulcerous spots is a zone of overlap, where one country’s or people’s territorial image of itself overlaps with another country’s or people’s territorial image of itself...

Neither the competitive struggle for power, nor economic competition, nor even fear can fully account for the intensity of these disputes. Often those factors are involved in some degree, but not to an extent sufficient to account for the amount of bad blood that exists. There is of course a struggle for power in each case, but what calls for psychological explanation is the special intensity of the desire for power over a certain piece of territory when that territory is perceived as part of the national self, even though it may make little contribution to the overall power of the nation...

NONEMPATHY

What is or what may be in the mind of an opponent is one of the most important things to think about if we want peace, but also one of the easiest to push out of our minds. In a natural-history approach to the kinds of nonempathy that are most common and most harmful, one quickly discovers three that stand out:

1. Not seeing an opponent’s longing for peace. An extreme example is the American tendency not to remember, when thinking about Soviet attitudes toward World War II, what the entire Soviet People went through in World War II.
2. Not seeing an opponent’s fear of being attacked... That blind spot is common on both sides of other conflicts also. The Arabs do not seem to realize how desperately

tiny Israel fears being untimely overwhelmed by the encircling and intensely hostile Arabs who out number it more than 30 to 1. Meanwhile most of the Israelis seem to have no conception of how their actual territorial expansion, most of all in their recent invasion of Lebanon, has given a plausible factual basis to Arab fears of “Zionist expansionism” and to an Arab conviction (Exaggerated, in a semi-paranoid way) that Israel’s immediate neighbors are all in danger as long as Israel exists...

3. Not seeing an opponent’s understandable anger. How often do people on either side of the East-West conflict realize, or even try to realize, the ways in which their own behavior has created anger and perhaps hate on the other side?

We Americans know well the many things the Soviets have done that have angered us... Stalin... Poland...Berlin... denied freedom-loving Jews the right to emigrate... Afghanistan... murdered 269 innocent people on a Korean airliner...

In how many of these cases have the Soviet decision-makers or the Soviet public recognized the anger for which they were providing a tangible bases of the effect of that anger in intensifying the malignant spiral process that has greatly increased the danger of nuclear war?

The Soviets have a somewhat similar anger list... Guatemala, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Angola, and, most recently, Nicaragua... supported reactionary dictators... in South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Greece, Spain, Zaire, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Cuba and El Salvador...

In how many of these cases did we Americans—whatever it was that we actually did—take fully into account the anger for which we were providing some tangible basis or the contribution made by that anger to the spiral process that has greatly increased the danger of nuclear war?

SECTION II

REVIEW ARTICLE ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE U.S. ENEMY IMAGE OF THE SOVIET UNION

[In the original, this section contained a photocopy of the following article.]

Silverstein, Brett (1989). Enemy images: The psychology U.S. attitudes and cognitions regarding the Soviet Union. *American Psychologist*, 44(6), 903-913.

SECTION III

ENEMY IMAGES IN FICTION

The portrayal of peoples and nations considered to be “enemies” as barbaric, rapacious, untrustworthy and inhumane has a long history. Sometimes these portrayals take the form of non-fiction—textbooks, news articles and broadcasts, documentaries, and the like. But fictionalized portrayals have many advantages. They tend to attract large audiences, to play upon emotions and to allow artistic license, which may be interpreted by those who so desire as freedom from the limitations of evidence or fact. Accusing the enemy of inhumanity is less effective than graphically depicting on the screen or printed page inhumane enemy acts against characters with whom people identify. In the words of a 1918 review of one anti-German World War I film: “Here we have an art of pure emotion which can go beneath thought, beneath belief, beneath ideals, down to the brute fact of emotional psychology and make a man or a woman who has hated war, all war, even this war, feel the surge of group emotion, group loyalty and group hate.”

The entertainment media used for this fictionalized propaganda have ranged from spy novels to brilliant drama. Shakespeare’s *The Tragedy of King Richard III*, for example, contains poetic descriptions of Richard’s dastardly deeds in his fight to grab and keep the crown of England. The play may be more than a great drama, however. Between 1585 and 1604, Queen Elizabeth I spent 72% of her nation’s revenues fighting a war with Spain, making this a very tense time for England. In 1586 a Government Propaganda Department was instituted which used stage plays, among other media, to inculcate the English people with a warlike spirit and a strong loyalty to the reigning Tudors. Many of Shakespeare’s historical plays date from this period and he knew that it would serve him well to please the rulers of England. This portrait of Richard III, a member of the House of York that was a rival of the Tudors, was an evil demon who schemed, lied, plotted the deaths of his relatives and ordered the smothering of children. It may be not only a work of historical art but also a hatchet job that promoted support for a government during wartime.

HYPOTHETICAL ATTACKS

One sub-genre of enemy portrayals might be termed “hypothetical attacks and conquests.” These describe in lurid detail what attacks by the enemy would be like and how horrible daily life would be if the attacks succeeded. In one example of this genre, the list of actions that are depicted as following an enemy victory in America include the institution of a religious inquisition, the burning of a Quaker who refuses to recant, the abolition of the use of the English language, the prohibition of trial by jury, the execution of the American head of state, and the massacre of protestors in one

American city. What makes this example so interesting is that it was written during the American Revolution by a supporter of King George III and purported to portray what life would be like if the rebel forces under General Washington were victorious. (The horrible consequences were to result from the seizure of power after the Revolution by the rebels' ally, France.)

After the United States entered World War I against Germany, the Committee on Public Information, created by President Wilson to drum up support for the war, distributed three-quarters of a million copies of a pamphlet entitled "Why America Fights Germany" which included the following:

Now let us picture what a sudden invasion of the United States by these Germans would mean; sudden because their settled way is to attack suddenly. First they would set themselves to capture New York City. While their fleet blockades the harbor and shells the city and the forts from far at sea, their troops land somewhere near and advance toward the city in order to plunder it... They pass through Lakewood, a station on the Central Railroad of New Jersey. They first demand wine for the officers and beer for the men. Angered to find that an American town does not contain large quantities of either, they pillage and burn the post-office, and most of the hotels and stores. One feeble old woman tries to conceal twenty dollars which she had been hoarding in her desk drawer; she is taken out and hanged (to save a cartridge.)

In 1948 *Look* magazine ran a pictorial article entitled "Could the Reds Seize Detroit?" describing how communists might be able to overrun an important American industrial center. The article accompanied posed photos of evil-looking communists who have murdered a telephone operator and a policeman in cold blood and included such lines as "Detroit... is the industrial heart of America. Today, a sickle is being sharpened to plunge into that heart."; " Assume that Russia declared war upon the United States; not in the obsolete fashion of serving formal notice, but in a sneak offensive—and all-out initial blow in the best blitzkrieg style"; "The first few minutes would be busy ones for the Communist flying squads. On split-second schedule groups would be liquidating certain civic and political leaders"; "Rabble-rousers, using sound trucks would roll into those sections of the city where years of preparation had conditioned the people to Communist leadership. Now, caught in the madness of the moment, emboldened by darkness, intoxicated by an unbridled license to kill, loot and destroy, mobs would swarm the streets."

ENEMIES ON FILM

Almost from their birth, motion pictures became an important medium of enemy portrayals. In the words of George Creel, head of the Committee on Public Information during World War I, "I believe in the motion picture just as I believe in the press, and in my work it plays just as powerful a part in the production of an aroused

and enlightened war sentiment." One pre-war silent film, *The Battle Cry of Peace*, depicted what would happen if the United States were to be invaded by an enemy army shown wearing German uniforms. The film was based on a book written by Henry Maxim, a major weapons manufacturer, and included among its cast former resident William Howard Taft, Secretary of State Lansing, Secretary of War Garrison and Admiral Dewey. In the film, the U.S. Army is overwhelmed, New Yorkers are forced to evacuate the city and the nation's Capitol is destroyed. Similarly, the ABC miniseries *Amerika* in 1987 showed the destruction of the Capitol by the Soviets. In real life, of course, the only troops to destroy the American capitol were those of the British in the War of 1812. But not since Thomas Jefferson described Great Britain as "...aiming at the exclusive domination of the seas, lost in corruption, of deep-rooted hatred towards us, hostile to liberty wherever it endeavors to shows its head, and the eternal disturber of the peace of the world" have the British born the brunt of serious enemy portrayals in this country. In fact, when a film about the American Revolution which depicted British Redcoats slaughtering women and children was shown during World War I, the producer was convicted of violating the Espionage Act and sent to a federal penitentiary.

During the First World War, Eric von Stroheim rose to fame playing cruel, mean-looking German officers who pushed around old women and pulled the hair out of children's heads. In a scene from *The Heart of Humanity*, he plays a German officer attempting to rape a sweet looking Red Cross nurse who is holding a baby. He yanks the baby away from her, she struggles, he rips and bites the clothing from her body. Meanwhile, German soldiers ignore her cries as they guzzle beer downstairs. The baby starts to cry, disturbing von Stroheim in the middle of his rape, so he rushed over to the window and tosses the baby out.

After World War II, noted American director D.W. Griffith relied on an enemy image in his film *The Birth of a Nation*. The film depicted the post-Civil war period in the American South. In the film, blacks (portrayed by white actors in makeup) are shown walking barefoot and chomping chicken in the state legislature. The most emotional scene occurs when the white Southerners are threatened by blacks intent on rape and murder but are rescued at the last minute by the "heroic" riders of the Ku Klux Klan who gallop into town to the strains of Wagner.

The United States has not had a monopoly on enemy portrayals on film. Before and during World War II, the Nazis made several films depicting the barbaric behavior of the British (*Uncle Kruger*), the Russians (GPU) and the Jews (*Jew Suss*, *The Rothchilds*). In the 1930's, the famed Soviet director Serge Eisenstein made *Alexander Nevsky*, a film about the 13-century invasion of Russia by Germanic knights. The Germans are shown wearing frightening helmets, stabbing the male inhabitants of one Russian town, trampling the females and picking up the infants one at a time and throwing them into a burning pit. The film was popular when it first appeared, then banned during the period of the Soviet-German nonaggression pact and widely distributed once again after the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union.

The British not only made several war films but also used enemy portrayals in historical films that show British soldiers heroically fighting against the evil forces of natives of British colonies. In films such as *Gunga Din* (1939), *The Lives of a Bengal Lancer* (1935), and *The Charge of the Light Brigade* (1936), made while the Indians under Gandhi were pressuring the British for their independence, popular actors such as Cary Grant, Douglas Fairbanks Jr., Tyrone Power and Errol Flynn play British soldiers who heroically defeat 19th –century uprisings in and around India. Although there is little doubt that in the British colonies many more natives than Englishmen were mistreated and killed, in these films the English are always gentlemen and the nationalist forces of the natives are always evil savages. If torture or mutilation is shown in these movies it is done by the natives to the English (e.g. *Bengal Lancer*, *Gunga Din*.) If a massacre is planned or takes place it is a native massacre of British subjects (e.g. *Gunga Din*, *Light Brigade*.) But if someone risks his own life to save a comrade or fights against great odds it is usually one of the handsome, heroic British (e.g. *Light Brigade*, *Gunga Din*, *Bengal Lancer*) except in *Gunga Din* where Sam Jaffe, playing the title role, is an Indian water boy in the British army who is treated as a hero for sacrificing his life to help the British defeat his own people. In these films, the battles fought by native populations to free themselves of British domination are turned into treacherous ambushes motivated by greed, savagery, or religious fanaticism and what was at the time the most powerful army in the world is turned into an underdog which triumphs because of the courage of a few heroes.

Some American films about Vietnam resemble these British historical films. Although *The Deer Hunter*, for example, does not glorify the American soldiers in the same way that the British films glorify Englishmen, almost every evil act in the film is perpetrated by the Vietnamese. One Vietnamese soldier opens a trap door and throws in a grenade, killing women and children. Another Vietnamese soldier attempts to shoot a mother and her children but is killed by one of the heroes of the film. American prisoners of war are held in cages with most of their bodies immersed in water in which rats are swimming. For sport, American POWs are forced to play Russian roulette while the Vietnamese drink, laugh, and bet on the results. *The Green Berets* shows American soldiers caring for orphans and bravely resisting the atrocities of the Vietnamese guerilla leader, who lives in a mansion, travels in a chauffeur-driven Citroen, and sups on caviar.

Another group of historical films that include enemy portrayals are those made in the United States or Great Britain that focus on the Russian Revolution. These tend to be filmed from the point of view of aristocrats who suffer as a result of the revolution. They include *Dr. Zhivago* (1965), a story of a doctor who is the orphaned son of a nobleman, and *Knight without Armor* (1937), a story of a countess escaping from the revolutionaries. Also in this category are *Tovarich* (1937), about a prince and princess impoverished by the revolution, and *Nicholas and Alexandra* (1971), about the czar and czarina who were killed by the revolutionaries.

The casting adds to the point of view, with popular actors such as Omar Sharif, Marlene Dietrich, Charles Boyer, and Claudette Colbert playing the victimized aristocrats, while the revolutionaries are played by unknowns or by character actors, such as Basil Rathbone and Rod Steiger, who are not handsome and charismatic and who, therefore, do not elicit much sympathy or identification from the audience.

For example, *Knight without Armor* tells the story of a beautiful countess (Marlene Dietrich) escaping from the madness of the Russian Revolution. The revolutionaries in the film are shown throwing bombs, ransacking homes, destroying valuable paintings, getting wildly drunk, sentencing people to death while smiling, taking the clothes from condemned prisoners, and attempting to rape and rob the countess. The only acts of kindness or courage in the film are those performed by people fighting against the revolutionaries, including the Cossacks and noblemen who are fighting to put the Czar back in power as well as a revolutionary commissar who heroically sacrifices his own life in order to allow the countess to escape from his comrades.

SOVIETS AS THE ENEMY

Such enemy portrayals of the Soviet Union, rare in the United States before the Second World War, became increasingly common afterwards. Nowadays, after four decades of such portrayals, exaggerated enemy images are more noticeable when they don't appear in novels and films about the Soviet Union than when they do.

These images appear most frequently in spy novels. Along with romances, western adventures, science fiction and mysteries, spy novels can be found in most American bookstores, dime stores and airports. Many of the most popular of these spy novels are well written stories that are not simplistically ideological. A large subset of the genre, however, is made up of tales of Soviet perfidy peopled with power-mad Russian bureaucrats, crazed generals, vicious KGB officers and murderous spies. You can usually judge these books by their covers, for they often have names like *Red Square*, *Russian Spring* or *The Kremlin Control* and they almost always display a hammer and sickle or a picture of the Kremlin. Many of the authors are little known. In some cases, however, the authors are well known for other books. Gerald Green, author of *Karpov's Brain* about a sadistic KGB Major, also wrote *The Last Angry Man* and *Holocaust*. Allen Drury, author of *The Roads of Earth* about a Soviet plan described in the book as designed to "eliminate the United States, decide the fate of all mankind, and assure for the Soviet Union the final conquest of the world", also wrote *Advise and Consent*. Some of the authors have made reputations in conservative politics. William Buckley, author of the Blackford Oakes novels, is best known as a conservative editor and commentator. Arnaud de Borchgrave, co-author of *The Spike*, is editor of the Washington Times, the newspaper associated with Reverend Sun Yun Moon. E. Howard Hunt, author of *The Kremlin Conspiracy*, was involved in the Watergate break-in.

These novels contain many recurrent themes. Over and over Soviet citizens or bureaucrats lament that the Soviet economy is failing, the people are unhappy, and leaders are trying to protect their privileged positions. Soviet technology breakthroughs inevitably result from purloining Western secrets. Blackmail and torture are common. Two books by different authors, for example, describe the Soviets or their allies tying man to a board or stretcher and then slowly feeding him feet first into a burning oven. Two books also share the theme of KGB agents who become ordained as priests as cover for murderous activities. One of these books goes as far as to place upon the KGB priest the responsibility for preventing a peaceful settlement of the Catholic - Protestant conflict in Northern Ireland. Characters who begin the novels by distrusting the C.I.A., the U.S. military or the use of weapons in space eventually realize the errors of their ways. Peace organizations are Soviet dupes to be called upon whenever the Kremlin wants to weaken Western defenses. Terrorist Organizations throughout the world are working for the Soviets. (Although none of these plot elements are based upon much evidence, this is one of the most obvious examples of the use of "artistic license" as both the F.B.I and the C.I.A. have concluded that there is no evidence linking the Soviet Union with world terrorism.) Soviet leaders who profess peace are either laying or under constant attack from militaristic generals and KGB officials who want war. The Soviet military is more powerful than that of the United States either because of its superior armaments or due to the weakening of the American might by liberal politicians and naïve peaceniks. And perhaps most dangerous of all, the Soviets usually plan an invasion--sometimes the target is Eastern Europe, sometimes the Persian Gulf, sometimes Western Europe--or a first strike attack against the United States. In *Red Chameleon*, published by Bantam after Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev (then described as Minister of Agriculture, which he was at one time) takes part in a discussion of a Soviet invasion of Europe. The only doubts he expresses about the plan deal with whether the Soviets can be certain that 'the Americans and NATO will go along with their declared intention not to be the first to use nuclear weapons'.

The extent and the characteristics of the readership of these novels is unclear. The propaganda they contain is obvious. But because there are so many of them, each relating hundreds of pages of Soviet evildoing, they constitute an important medium of enemy portrayals.

While evil Russians have appeared in a number of recent films (notably several of the James Bond series), the enemy image is most evident in four: *Rambo* and *Rocky IV*, both starring Sylvester Stallone, *Invasion U.S.A.* and *Red Dawn*. *Rambo* stars Stallone in the title role single-handedly locating and freeing several U.S. POWs that are imprisoned by the Vietnamese (who are clearly under the command of Soviet officers). *Rocky IV* pits Stallone as the champion boxer against a might Russian challenger. *Invasion U.S.A.* stars Chuck Norris (who in *Missing in Action* also frees POWs from Vietnamese imprisonment) as the one American who can prevent two agents named Kikko and Mikhail Rostov from using terrorism to push the United States

into mass anarchy. *Red Dawn*, the most similar to *Amerika* of the four, portrays the effects of a Soviet invasion of the United States on a mid-Western town.

In all of these films, costumes, makeup, lighting and acting are combined to make the actors portraying the Russians appear savage and fierce. The gigantic, steely-jawed Russian boxer in *Rocky IV*, who is often shown wearing a Soviet military uniform, is so animalistic that he barely speaks throughout the film other than to utter threats in a deep, spooky voice reminiscent of the character "Lurch" on the old television program, *The Adams Family*.

Just as the powerful British Army was made to appear the underdogs in India, so the powerful Americans in these films always start at a disadvantage. Rambo has to fight hundreds of Vietnamese and Soviet troops alone. The Soviet agents in *Invasion U.S.A.* are able to wreak chaos in the United States, almost bringing the nation to its knees, before Chuck Norris stops them only by using a clever trick. The Soviet sneak attack in *Red Dawn* overwhelms the small town. The only resistance to the Soviet tanks, bombs and helicopters is offered by a handful of heroic high school students. *Rocky IV* is a perfect example of the underdog technique. Although Rocky is the heavyweight champion boxer of the world, his Russian opponent is so strong, so fierce, and so invincible that Rocky's decision to fight him is described by his wife as "suicide". When was the last time you saw a heavyweight champion go into a fight as a sacrificial lamb and win only through guts and determination?

All of the horrible heavier of enemies is exhibited by the Soviets in these films. The off screen torture of the father of two of the young heroes is implied in *Red Dawn* by showing him with blood on his face. The onscreen torture using electric shock administered by a Russian is graphically depicted in *Rambo*. Perhaps even more horrifying is the way in which the Russians in the film are portrayed as enjoying killing and inflicting pain. In *Invasion U.S.A.*, one of the Russian agents murders in cold blood two American teenagers who are necking on a beach while listening to a portable television. Immediately after the murder he smiles as he watches a talk show on the television. In *Rocky IV*, immediately after he pulverizes a Mohammed Ali-like character called "Apollo Creed" in an exhibition match, the Russian boxer comments "If he dies, he dies". Civilians are massacred in *Invasion U.S.A.* and *Red Dawn* and in both films the Russians deliberately gun down young children. *Red Dawn* actually portrays the Soviets as beginning their invasion of the United States by slaughtering most of the students and teachers of a mid-West high school. *Invasion U.S.A.* even includes a touching holiday scene in which the evil Mikhail Rostov smiles as he blows up a suburban home along with her family residing there just after the little girl places an angel atop her Christmas tree. The rape in *Red Dawn* is not shown on screen but one of the two female leads is almost mute through out the film after "those sons of bitches tried having their way with them". It is one thing to portray competition with or even danger from another nation. Only in a full-fledged "enemy portrayal", however, are groups of people shown as being totally evil, enjoying murder for murder's sake and

expending massive resources at great risks to themselves in order to hurt or destroy harmless civilians.

As in *Gunga Din* and *Knight Without Armor*, the only decent action taken by an enemy in *Red Dawn* is one in which he betrays his own side. At the end of the film, a Hispanic (perhaps Nicaraguan) officer, realizing that the Americans who have killed hundreds of his men are the real good guys, allows them to escape when he has the chance to stop them. This incident points up the one element of these films that is rare in earlier enemy portrayals: the use of people from Third World nations as pawns of the Soviets. In *Rambo* the Vietnamese, in *Invasion U.S.A.* many Hispanics and some Asians, in *Red Dawn* Cubans and Nicaraguans all act as Soviet underlings sent out to do most of the dirty work. Even *Rocky IV* has a Cuban trainer assisting the Russians. Americans are just not up against the Soviets in these films, we have to face every Soviet ally. In *Amerika* the forces occupying the United States do so in the name of the United Nations. There the whole world is against us.

These techniques have effectively engendered hatred in the past, particularly because people are usually so ignorant about the behaviors of their adversaries. If the world continues to change, perhaps they will less often be used against the Soviet Union in the near future. Let's hope that by combining our knowledge of the techniques that have been used in the past with our understanding that it is the enemies that change, not the portrayals, we can render the images less effective when they are used against other enemies.

Notes:

1. Information on *Amerika* screenplay from Gottlieb, J. The politics of *Amerika*. *Los Angeles Herald Examiner*, June 3, 1986, B-1.
2. Quote of film reviewer from MacGowan, K. Hearts of the world, *New Republic*, July 20, 1918, 344.
3. Information on Richard III and Elizabethan England from "Shakespeare a propagandist too." *The Literary Digest*, October 5, 1929, 27.
4. The article describing the results of a victory by Washington's forces first appeared in *Royal Gazette*, March 17, 1779. It is cited in Davidson, P. *Propaganda and the American Revolution 1736-1783*. New York: Norton, 1973.
5. Committee for Public Information pamphlet "Why America Fights Germany" cited in Vaughn, S. *Holding Fast the Inner Lines*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980, 88.

6. Metcalfe, J. Could the Reds Seize Detroit? *Look*, August 3, 1948, 21-27.
7. Quote from George Creel cited in Mock, J.R. & Larson, C. *Words that Won the War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939, 156.
8. Information on *The Battle Cry of Peace* from Isenberg, M.T. *War on Film*. Rutherford, N. J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1981, 102.
9. Quote from Thomas Jefferson cited in Ford, P.L. (Ed.) *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson IX*, N.Y.: Putnams, 1848, 519.
10. Information on anti-British film from Isenberg, *Op. cit.*, 108.
11. Nazi films are discussed in Taylor, R. *Film Propaganda*. N.Y.: Barnes & Noble, 1979.

SECTION IV:

AUDIENCE PARTICIPATION ACTIVITIES AND MATERIALS

Audience participation is a vital ingredient for successful learning, particularly for exploring and changing attitudes. While lectures are useful in communicating information and in raising questions, they are not always effective in helping people to identify and work through their feelings, to relate basic concepts to their own experience, or to think critically and to find their own voice. Since lectures can be monotonous, participatory activities are needed to provide a change of pace.

Below is a brief description of recommended activities and suggested contexts for using them. In the following pages, the activities are presented along with detailed instructions and any handouts that are needed.

The activities are divided into two categories: those which apply broadly to the subject of enemy images and those which apply most directly to U.S.—Soviet relations. Although the latter appear to be more specialized, they can be modified with a minimum of effort to apply to enemy images that occur in the relationships between any two groups. For example, the U.S.—Soviet role-play could easily be adjusted so that the roles are Arabs and Israelis, blacks and whites, etc. Ultimately, these activities will be most successful when they are supplemented by the imagination and audience sensitivity of the presenter.

ACTIVITIES CONCERNING ENEMY IMAGES IN GENERAL

1. **Who Said It.** This is a brief quotation from Thomas Jefferson which may be used to introduce the concept of enemy images. Using this quotation adds a touch of irony, and it helps listeners to look beyond recent history and to see that even our most revered leaders have cultivated images of the enemy. This use of humor and historical perspective can aid in creating a positive, receptive atmosphere, particularly with skeptical audiences.
2. **Drawings.** By asking participants to draw an enemy, this activity helps people to understand more clearly their own hidden assumptions and feelings about enemies. This activity shows the relevance of the concept of the enemy image on a very personal level, and it can be effective in dealing with people who are highly articulate but who tend to shy away from emotional reflection.
3. **Matching Enemy Images and Nations.** Participants are shown sketches of enemies from popular posters (taken from "Faces of the Enemy" by Sam Keen) and are asked to identify which image goes with which nation. This is a powerful tool for showing the universality of enemy images across time, place, and leadership.

4. **The Changing Face of the Enemy.** This historical list of U.S. “enemies” reveals the fickleness of enemy images. Reading at a fast tempo through our rapidly changing list of political enemies adds a dash of humor, creates a sense of historical perspective and stimulates hope by showing that relationships of enmity are highly malleable.

ACTIVITIES CONCERNING U.S. – U.S.S.R. ENMITY

1. **Identify the Names.** This activity, which asks people to identify either dissidents or leaders of various nations, shows that Americans tend to know more about the dissident voices of “enemy” nations than of allied nations. This is particularly useful in discussions of propaganda and in showing how we selectively attend to and apply double standards to what we read about our “enemies.”

2. **American – Soviet Role Play.** A useful technique for audiences of forty or fewer is to divide participants into two groups who play the roles of conservative Americans and conservative Soviets, respectively. Each group constructs a list of the main characteristics of the other. Then the entire audience reconvenes, and each group presents its list of characteristics. This is an effective tool for showing mirror imaging and building empathy with the Soviets. The method may be applied using any two groups so long as proper instructions are provided to help participants assume their respective roles.

3. **SARAS Scale.** This “trick” test appears to measure the attitudes of Americans toward Soviets. The audience will be surprised to learn that the statements are actually opinions expressed by the Soviets. Either the entire scale or the selected items that apply best to the rapidly changing U.S. –Soviet relationship may be used. The test helps audiences to grasp the concept of mirror imaging and to see how unrecognized biases complicate relationships between nations.

Activities follow, each on a separate page.

Who Said It?

Goals:

- (1) to provide an example of an exaggerated enemy image in written forms;
- (2) to show that enemy images have been cultivated in various eras and by prominent U.S. leaders;
- (3) to invite the audience to step outside of the current situation and to view enemy images in historical perspective;
- (4) to stimulate a sense of irony and skepticism regarding enemy images by giving an illustration involving England, which is now one of our closest allies.

Procedure: Tell the audience that the following description of a foreign nation was given by a President of the U.S. Ask them to identify both the President and the nation to which he is referring. Then read this passage:

“...[This nation is] aiming at the exclusive domination of the [world], lost in corruption, of deep-rooted hatred towards us, hostile to liberty wherever it endeavors to show its head, and the eternal disturber of the peace of the world.”

Answers: The president was Thomas Jefferson and the nation he was referring to was Great Britain. He wrote this description in 1793 after his term in office. It is cited in P. L. Ford (Ed.), *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson IX*. New York: Putnam, 1848, p. 519.

Points to be considered:

1. If even so knowledgeable and intelligent a person as Jefferson could fall prey to enemy images, going so far as to conclude that the British were the eternal disturbers of world peace, the rest of us should realize that we too may not be above the problem.
2. Imagine if nuclear weapons had existed at the time. We might never have lived because of a nuclear between two nations that eventually came to be close allies.

Drawing an Enemy

Goals:

- (1) to personalize the concept of “enemy;”
- (2) to increase awareness of the features typically attributed to enemies;
- (3) to increase awareness of one’s own thoughts and feelings about enemies;
- (4) to help the participants to express their feelings about enemies.

Materials: Each participant will need to have at least one sheet of paper and a pen or pencil.

Procedure: Ask the audience members to spend ten or fifteen minutes drawing a picture of an enemy. Tell them that they may draw a personal enemy, an historical enemy, or whatever they like. If the audience needs to be enlivened, you might encourage them to make the enemy as mean and horrifying as possible.

Suggestions for discussion:

1. Ask for volunteers to show what they drew, to describe it briefly to the audiences, and to say what they liked least about the enemy that is pictured. After several volunteers have presented their pictures, point out recurrent features and themes.
2. Ask for volunteers to describe how they feel about whomever they have drawn. After several volunteers have done so, comment on the common feelings such as fear, anger and mistrust, and loathing that tend to recur.
3. To stimulate reflection on the feelings that enemy images can evoke in us, ask questions such as “What would you think and feel if the enemy you have drawn struck a deal with others toward whom you have negative feelings?” or “What would you think and feel if the enemy you have drawn came to you and asked to go out to lunch and to make peace between the two of you?”

Matching Enemy Images and Nations

Goals:

- (1) to show the universality of enemy images;
- (2) to increase awareness of the characteristics typically ascribed to “enemies;”
- (3) to demonstrate the process of dehumanization and its affective impact;
- (4) to increase awareness of the emotional power of political cartoons.

Materials: Each participant should have a copy of the following three pages, which include two pages showing numbered images of the enemy and an answer sheet. The answer sheet will be easiest to use if it is not attached to the other pages. Only the presenter should have the answer key which follows the two pages of images.

Procedure: Tell the audience that in order to understand enemy images, it is best to see real examples of them from popular media. Then invite the participants to play a game in which they try to match which enemy image goes with which of the nations listed at the bottom of the answer sheet, writing their choice in the appropriate blank. Also ask them to notice the symbols and features used in each picture to construct an enemy. After several minutes have passed, and most people have completed the task, go through the list and ask the audience for the answers, an exercise that typically evokes curiosity and diverse emotional reactions. Then engage the participants in discussion.

Possible Points and Questions for Discussion:

- (1) Note that enemy images are universal—they occur in many different times and places and under different leaders.
- (2) Ask participants how they felt as they viewed various pictures, helping them to get in touch with their emotional responses.
- (3) Ask what are some of the symbols and techniques used by the artists to make the enemy seem evil or threatening.
- (4) Ask the audience to identify two examples of dehumanization (Figures 11 and 12 are obvious examples, but dehumanization is also at work in many of the others). Then ask why dehumanization plays such a powerful role in enemy images.

Answer Sheet—Matching Enemy Images and Nations

Using the list of nations at the bottom of the page, identify the source of each image of the enemy, writing the answer in the appropriate blank.

Picture

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____
6. _____
7. _____
8. _____
9. _____
8. _____
9. _____
10. _____
11. _____
12. _____

Choices: Germany, World War II
 U.S.
 Nationalist China
 U.S.S.R.
 Netherlands
 Egypt
 Catholic Church

Key—Matching Enemy Images and Nations

1. **Germany, WWII.** This image shows Bolshevism, the killer of Germany. Note especially the savage-like quality of the mouth, teeth, eyes, and eyebrows.
2. **U.S., WWII.** The Tokyo Kid with enlarged teeth, dripping blood, and saw blades and knife suggesting a killing machine.
3. **Nationalist Chinese Image of Mainland China.** The Communists have no conscience; they drive good people to the battlefield to die in their “human sea” onslaught. Note that the enemy is very big and the people plead and pray yet are slaughtered.
4. **Catholic Church (16th Century).** This image shows Martin Luther speaking with the voice of the devil.
5. **U.S.** The atheistic communists tear down Christianity. Note the enlargement of the hands. This image is by Edmund Duffy of the *Baltimore Sun* won a Pulitzer Prize in 1930.
6. **Netherlands, 1985.** The Reagan Horror Picture Show.
7. **Origin unknown.** This reverse image identifies the warrior with Christ.
8. **U.S.S.R.** This figure, which represents the Pentagon, wears white gloves, which cannot hide the bloody deeds that it perpetrates. Note the enlarged hands.
9. **U.S., WWII.** The barbarous Jap.
10. **U.S.S.R., 1907.** The Jew as terrorists and subversive.
11. **U.S.S.R.** Tito.
12. **Egypt.** Indira Gandhi.

The figures are from Sam Keen’s *Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of a Hostile Imagination*. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986.

The Changing Face of the Enemy

- Goals:** (1) to demonstrate that enemy images are pervasive features of U.S. history;
- (2) to show how rapidly enemy images can change;
- (3) to create a sense of the absurdity and historical folly of enemy images.

Materials: The list of dates and enemy relationships on the following two pages.

Procedures: Hand out the following two pages to the members of the audience and ask them to read them quickly to themselves. Or read the pages aloud yourself at a rapid pace, using rhythm and gesture to add a touch of humor and to accentuate the absurdity of enemy images. Another way of adding humor is to read the reversals in sequence, pointing out, for example, that in 1940 we loved the Finns and hated the Russians, whereas in 1941 we loved the Russians and Hated the Finns. You might note that the term “love” and “hate” are perhaps too strong, but their use does not change the essential point that our relationships and images flip-flop rapidly over time.

Points for Discussion:

1. This list ends in 1964. What should be added to update the list?
2. Enemies often seem implacable, and our situation often seems hopeless. Yet the historical record, including the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989, indicates that enemy images do in fact change rapidly over time. There is room for hope, and we need to ask ourselves what we can do to improve a relationship that is currently locked in hostility and enmity.
3. Are their psychological benefits of having enemies that encourage the formation of so many enemy images? Do we need enemies?

Changing Allegiances

- 1755 We loved the British and hated the French. (French & Indian War)
- 1776 We loved the French and hated the British. (American Revolution)**
- 1799 We hated the French. (Sea Battles with the French)
- 1812 We loved the French and hated the British. (War of 1812)**
- 1840s We loved Southerners and hated Mexicans. (War with Mexico over Texas)
- 1861 We hated the Southerners and the British. (Civil War)**
- 1898 We hated the Spanish. (Spanish-American War)
- 1899 We hated the Chinese and the Filipinos. (Conquest of the Philippines)**
- 1900 We loved the Japanese and hated the Chinese. (Boxer Uprising in China)
- 1904 We loved the Japanese and hated the Russians. (Russo-Japanese War)**
- 1914 We hated the Mexicans. (Marines land at Vera Cruz)
- 1914 We loved the British & French but hated Austrians & Germans. (Beginning of World War I)**
- 1915 We loved the Italians. (Italy joins the allies)
- 1916 We hated the Mexicans. (Pershing invades Mexico)**
- 1917 We loved the Japanese and Chinese but not the Russians. (Russian Bolshevik Revolution)
- 1918 We loved the Italians and hated the Russians. (U.S. troops invade Russia)**
- 1927 We loved the Japanese and hated the Chinese. (U.S. bombards Nanking)
- 1935 We hated the Italians. (Italy invades Ethiopia)**
- 1936 We loved the Chinese and hated the Russians. (Communists despoil China)

1939 *We loved the British & French and hated Germans and Russians. (Beginning of World War II)*

1940 We loved the Finns and hated the Russians. (Russia invades Finland)

1941 *We loved the Russians and hated the Finns. (Russia fights Germany and Finland)*

1941 We loved the Chinese, British, & Russians but hated the Germans, Italians, and Japanese. (World War II)

1942 *We loved some French and hated others. (Vichy Regime)*

1943 We loved the Chinese, Russians, and British. (World War II continues)

1945 *We loved the French and hated the Germans, Italians, and the Japanese. (End of World War II)*

1947 We hated the Russians but loved the Germans and Italians. (Beginning of the Cold War)

1951 *We hated the Chinese and loved the Japanese. (Korean War)*

1959 We loved the Cubans.

1962 *We hated the Cubans.*

1964 We hated the French. (French opposition to our Vietnam Policy)

Identify the Names

Goals:

- (1) to increase awareness of our ignorance and selective knowledge of other nations;
- (2) to stimulate reflection about the role that the media play in filtering information about other nations.
- (3) to demonstrate the double standard that exists with regard to our knowledge of “friendly” and “hostile” nations.

Materials: You need only this sheet. But you should consider changing the names to fit the times and to connect with the particular subject of your talk, the regions emphasized, etc.

Procedure: Ask the members of the audience to raise their hands if they can identify each of the following names. To avoid having everyone trying to appear smart, you might ask them to raise their hands only if they are certain and can tell them that you will call on one of the people with raised hands to make the identification. Read the names one at a time and allow enough time for the audience to look around to see how many people can identify each name. You might also pick someone to estimate what proportion of the audience can identify each name.

1. Andrei Sakharov
2. Eduard Shevardnaze
3. Lech Walesa
4. Tadeusz Mazowicki
5. Tony Benn
6. Margaret Thatcher

Answers: The first pair of names are from the Soviet Union. Sakharov is a famous dissident, whom many Americans can identify. Fewer identify the Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnaze.

The second pair of names is from Poland. Many Americans can identify Walesa, the leader of Solidarity, a prominent labor group and the source of much resistance to the Communist government in the 1980s. Fewer can identify Mazowiecki, the Premier of Poland.

The third pair of names is from Great Britain. Few Americans can identify Benn, who is a leader of the Labor Party. Most can identify Thatcher, the Prime Minister.

Points of Discussion:

(1) Note that when it comes to allies, Americans learn mainly about the leaders but not about dissidents. But for "enemies," Americans learn about dissidents but not about leaders.

(2) Why is our information about other nations skewed, and what psychological processes are at work?

American – Soviet Role Play

Goals:

- (1) to demonstrate mirror-imaging and the use of double standards in U.S.-Soviet relations;
- (2) to increase empathy with the perspective of conservative Soviets and Americans;
- (3) to provide an experience in the formation of an in-group and an out-group.

Materials: A room with movable chairs is ideally suited for this activity, although it can also be done in a room with fixed seating. The room should have a chalkboard or an overhead projection. You should supply two writing pads and pens.

Procedures: Tell the participants that the best way to understand the effects of enemy images is through experiential activities such as role-playing. Invite them to set their customary perspectives and roles aside, and divide the participants into two groups on a random basis. For example, you might have everyone on the left side of the room play conservative Soviets while everyone on the right side plays conservative Americans. Ask the two groups to move physically into two different locations, such as different corners of the room. After the two groups have situated themselves, give each group the appropriate instructions (you may either use those provided below or make up your own). You may give each group its instructions, or, to save time, you may have colleague give one set of instructions while you give the other.

Tell the “American” group that their task is to play the role of conservative Americans (citizens, government officials, military leaders, etc). Remind them that they believe that the U.S. is the moral voice and keeper of world order in the world, that the U.S. has worked hard to halt Soviet expansionism (remember the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe following World War II and the invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan), that the U.S. nuclear buildup prevented war, that the Soviet empire is destined to crumble under the crush of economic failure and ethnic turbulence, and that it is likely that Gorbachev will be replaced by a conservative, militaristic regime. Also remind the group that they will aspire to traditional American values such as freedom, democracy, religion, human rights, hard work, and individuality. They also believe in the superiority of the capitalist system, which promotes initiative, strong motivation, and high standards of living. Having established this mindset, tell them that their task is to quickly generate a list of the main characteristics of the Soviet Union. Ask one member of the group to keep a record of the list.

Tell the “Soviet” group that their task is to play the role of conservative Soviets (citizens, government officials, military leaders, etc.). Remind them that they believe that the Soviet Union is surrounded by countries that have traditionally been sources of invasion (remember, for example, the invasions by the Mongols-Tatars, Napoleon, and Hitler), that the Soviet Union has worked to create “buffer zones” around its borders to prevent hostile forces from reaching the motherland, and that the Soviet Union has supported socialist movement of national liberation, protecting Third World nations from the U.S. (e.g., remember the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and U.S. interventionism in Iran, the Philippines, and Nicaragua). Also remind them that they take great pride in the achievements of Soviet and Russian culture (e.g., in literature, ballet, and music) and that they hold dear the traditional Soviet values of hard work and of individual sacrifice for the collective good. They believe that the Soviet system, despite its weaknesses and its current political turbulence, has protected its people from the corruption and evils of the capitalist system (e.g., widespread unemployment, homelessness, drug abuse, and moral degeneration) and will move ahead in fulfilling its historic socialist mission. Having established this mindset, tell them that their task is to quickly generate a list of the main characteristics of the United States. Ask one member of the group to keep a record of the list.

Let the two groups work independently approximately ten minutes. You may look in on each group during this time, encouraging them, if necessary, to expand their list or to avoid lengthy discussions. The exercise works best when the group members generate adjectives in a rapid-fire manner. Most groups fall into this mode of operation quickly and work with excitement and laughter.

After ten minutes have passed, move to the front of the room and ask the two groups to report, keeping everyone seated where they are and asking them to stay “in role.” First ask the recorder for the “Soviet” group to report slowly five the items generated. Write these on one side of the board under a heading such as **The United States is...** Next ask the recorder for the “American” group to report slowly five of the times generated. Write these on the other side of the board under a heading such as **The Soviet Union is...** Then ask the first group for another five items, and so on, alternating between Soviet groups until all of the characteristics have been listed. During this reporting process, which usually takes approximately ten minutes, you should pay attention to the spontaneous comments and reactions of the participants. After the reporting process has been completed, ask the participants to take part in a discussion.

Points for Discussion:

(1) Is there is any overlap or similarity in the negative items (e.g., “aggressive”) generated by the two groups? What effects can this mirror-imaging have?

(2) Do the U.S. and the Soviet Union use double standards in evaluating the actions of their own nation and of other nations? How was this process manifest in this activity?

(3) During the role-play, were there any signs of the formation of an in-group and out-group mentality? How did the "Soviets" feel as the "Americans" listed their characteristics and vice-versa?

(4) How often do we try to see the world from the perspective of another people or of a group with whom we disagree? What role does empathy play in peacemaking, and what can be done to facilitate empathy?

Soviet-American Relations Attitude Scale (SARAS)

Goals:

- (1) to demonstrate mirror-imaging in Soviet-American relations;
- (2) to increase sensitivity to one's own hidden assumptions and biases regarding the Soviet Union;
- (3) to measure attitudes regarding Soviet-American relations.

Materials: Each participant should have a pencil and a copy of the following six-page questionnaire.

Procedure: Distribute the questionnaire, telling the participants that in studying enemy images, it is important to collect data on attitudes regarding Soviet-American relations. Ask them to complete the survey without discussing it, allowing approximately ten minutes for this task.

After everyone has completed the survey, you may reveal to the audience that this is a "trick" questionnaire—all the statements are opinions expressed by Soviets, mostly about Americans or the West. Mirror imaging is evidenced in the fact that most Americans readily believe that the statements apply directly to the Soviets, while many Soviets believe that the statements apply directly to Americans.

Points for Discussion:

- (1) Ask the participants to re-read the statements with an eye toward understanding that many Soviets actually see things this way. As a means of uncovering hidden assumptions and biases, ask participants to identify which statements seem most surprising in light of what they now know.
- (2) Having told the audience that the psychological process at work here is mirror-imaging, ask them what effects it might have on Soviet-American relations.

Additional Information:

(1) The quote in Item 6 is from Lenin (See Herbert J. Muller, *The Uses of the Past*, p. 303).

(2) Item 22 is paraphrased from Androv, *Pravda*, 1/13/84, p. 1. Item 23 is paraphrased from Chernenko, *Pravda*, 2/14/84, pp. 1-2. See S. Plous, "Perceptual Illusions and Military Realities," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1985, 2, 363-389.

(3) Most Americans erroneously believe that item 25 applies to the U.S.S.R. A survey by the Public Agenda Foundation, a nonpartisan research organization, showed that 81% of Americans believed incorrectly that it was U.S. policy "to use nuclear weapons if and only if our adversaries use them against us first." See Yankelovich, D. and Doble, J. "The Public Mood: Nuclear Weapons and the U.S.S.R," *Foreign Affairs*, 1984, 63, 31-46.

(4) Dr. Thomas Greening has used the SARAS questionnaire extensively and welcomes reports on the results of using SARAS as a teaching device. Please send any reports to this address:

Thomas Greening, Ph.D.
Suite 205
1314 Westwood Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90024

SARAS

As Americans, we have many beliefs, feelings and opinions about the Soviet Union and the Soviet People. Please indicate your degree of agreement with the following statements by marking the scale beneath each one.

1. If more of them would visit our country and meet us as people, they would understand and like us better.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

2. As a people they are warm, out-going and peace-loving, but their leaders are militaristic, self-serving and aggressively opportunistic toward us.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

3. If they knew more about our complex history they would have a better understanding of our problems today and how we try to solve them.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

4. They do not appreciate the degree of success we have had in making a nation out of many different groups of people spread across a continent.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

5. They have some cultural traditions, literature, music, dance, etc. that I like and that are great contributions to world culture, but overall I prefer my country.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

6. As it moves into the modern world, Russia must deal with the fact that it has been an "Asiatic and barbarous land."

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

7. Because of their history, traditions, internal problems, and national personality tendencies, they have a greater tendency toward violence and disregard for human life than we do.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

8. In their schools, there is more emphasis on learning what the system wants them to think than on learning how to think for themselves.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

9. Their children are open, charming and delightful, but too often lose those qualities when they grow up, become indoctrinated, and have to live within their system.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

10. The information they receive is largely selected by the people who control the media.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

11. Their harassment and persecution of their best artists and thinkers shows that they do not allow creativity and freedom the way we do.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

12. Their system and philosophy of government and economics do not really work, but they are too wrapped up in them to see or admit this.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

13. Luxury goods in their country are often concentrated in the hands of the privileged groups.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

14. They should work harder at solving their internal domestic problems instead of trying to promote their system around the world.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

15. Their attempts to interfere in our internal affairs and enlist sympathizers make problems worse between our countries.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

16. Their boycott of the Olympics was a political move that served their leaders at the expense of athletes and sports fans.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

17. Our boycott of the Olympics was a necessary and justified decision given the adverse conditions that existed at that time.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

18. Their government often does things that are aggressive bluffs intended to make us back down on issues that are important to our national well-being.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

19. Although we were allies in World War II against the Germans, toward the end of the war their actions often had political rather than military purposes, and this cost the lives of many of our soldiers.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

20. I wish there were ways we could get them to appreciate more fully the grave risks of nuclear war and the devastation it would cause.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

21. What they call equality of nuclear and other weapons really masks their desire for superiority.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

22. The main obstacle to peace—and the arms negotiation are persuasive evidence of this—is their attempts to achieve military superiority.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

23. We do not seek military superiority and we have no intention of dictating our will to them, but we must not allow them to upset the military equilibrium that has been achieved.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

24. Part of their negotiation strategy is to make proposals they know we will reject, so they can claim that they want to negotiate but we are preventing it.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

25. Their refusal to adopt a “no first use” policy like ours adds to the tension between our countries.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

26. If they answered a questionnaire like this about our country, their answers would be biased by the propaganda they have received about us.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

27. The results of a survey like this conducted in their country would tell us more about what they want to believe or have been told to believe than the way things really are.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

28. The problem with confronting them with facts about their country and ours is that they will usually go on believing what they want or have been taught to believe.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

29. A careful, objective review of history and facts would support the opinions in this survey, with which I agree.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

30. It is difficult to resolve differences of opinion expressed by us and by them because they are wrapped up in their own way of thinking and often don't even know it, or at least won't admit it.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

31. A survey like this does not sufficiently address the ways in which our system is better than theirs.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree
|-----|-----|-----|-----|

SECTION V

RETHINKING ENMITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENEMY IMAGES

PREFACE

As the Cold War fades and the winds of freedom sweep across Europe, we have an unprecedented opportunity to construct a new, more peaceful world order. Building this order required careful attention to the ideas of interdependence, of collective security, and of the interconnectedness of peace, justice, and environmental issues. In short, the time has come for new thinking about security.

Unfortunately, there are significant psychological obstacles to new thinking about security. Too often, our thinking remains chalked by simplistic images and ethnocentric stereotypes of other nations. In the United States, images abound of "the lazy Latino" or "the cold-hearted communists." Similarly, other nations harbor stereotypes of "the greedy capitalists" or "the American bullies." Locked in the grip of these stereotypes, we mistake our images as realities, setting ourselves up for making misperceptions and erroneous assumptions about the character, intentions and behavior of other nations.

A particularly dangerous stereotype is the exaggerated image of the enemy, the representation of another group or individual as implacably evil, aggressive, and untrustworthy. Psychological research over the past two decades has identified the exaggerated image of the enemy as a key source and amplifier of international tensions.

Today, enemy images continue to fuel conflicts and to limit our receptiveness to new ideas. Yet the general public has little awareness of enemy images and their psychological effects. What are needed are public education programs that heighten awareness of enemy images and their effects and that encourage critical thinking about enemy images. One such program is the Enemy Images Project of Psychologists for Social Responsibility, and we welcome you to participate in it.

The goal of this paper is to help prepare to you take part in the Project by providing a general overview of the psychology of enemy images. Since it is intended as a beginning, we have provided references in order to allow you to learn more about enemy images on your own.

INTRODUCTION

Enmity is a relatively permanent fixture on the international landscape. For over forty years, East-West enmity has dominated U.S. national security policies. In the Mid-East, enmity is a festering condition of life, triggering sporadic outbursts of war and terrorism. In many developing nations, enmity rages between competing internal factions, speckling the globe with civil wars and low-intensity conflicts.

Conflict and enmity have many sources--political, economic, ideological, religious, and so on. But conflict and enmity also have psychological causes. One of the most significant psychological causes is the exaggerated image of the enemy, the representation of another group as implacably evil, aggressive, and untrustworthy. While there is real conflict and enmity, the mind embellishes reality, creating demon images that go beyond the negative characteristics and conflict that actually exist. The resulting exaggerated enemy images produce a host of ill effects ranging from misperceptions of the adversary to excessive fear and willingness to take part in dangerous arms races.

Overcoming enemy images is a bit like overcoming a disease. To defeat a disease, we must first understand it and discover how it works, thereby putting ourselves in a position to stop it and prevent it. In the same way, moving beyond enemy images requires that we first understand them. In particular, we must ask what are the psychological processes involved in enemy imagery, and how do enemy images influence our thinking and social behavior? To move beyond enemy images, we must also ask how enemy images can be resisted. The following sections sketch the answers to these questions in broad strokes. These answers are not final since no science, including psychology can provide complete explanations. But they are much more than opinions or speculations, for they are based upon hard evidence collected over a span of several decades.

ENEMY IMAGES AND BIASED THINKING

The ability to think is one of our species' greatest assets. But this ability carries no guarantees of accuracy, logic, and open-mindedness. Without even knowing it, many people harbor deep prejudices, tune out information that does not fit into their preconceptions, make unwarranted negative judgments, and lose their minds to other points of view.

These biases do not reflect a lack of intelligence; even the most intelligent people can and do engage in misguided thinking. Rather, they reflect the operation of normal psychological processes that may affect all of us in varying degrees. With regard to enemies, these processes include stereotyping, dehumanization, selective perception and remembering, and attributional biases.

Dehumanization

Mentally, one of the first things we do to our enemies is to dehumanize them by overlooking their human qualities and by depicting them as subhuman. During World War II, for example, Americans portrayed the Japanese as jungle monkeys and lice (see Figure 1), while the Japanese portrayed U.S. leaders as demons who wore a deceitful mask of friendship. Nazis depicted Jews as rats and as vermin. Similarly, both the Arabs and Israelis often denounce each other as terrorists who have little regard for human life. During the Cold War, millions of Americans saw dehumanized images of the Soviets in films such as *Rocky IV* and *Rambo*, which portrayed the Soviets as cold, bloodthirsty, and machine-like. In the 1980s, Iranians often constructed dehumanized images of Americans who were portrayed as Satanic bullies.

Dehumanization is no mere oversimplification--it is part of the psychological engine for war. To see the importance of dehumanization in warfare, think how much easier it is to kill someone while imagining a satanic figure rather than a father or a good citizen. Before we can kill, we must have an enemy and a reason for killing, and the dehumanized enemy image gives us both. Seeing an inhuman figure that threatens to kill us, we suspend our normal compassion and moral concerns that inhibit killing. Because it is either us or them and they are inhuman, we have a ready justification for killing, and we have more readily become warriors or supporters of war activities.

Stereotyping

Dehumanized images involve stereotyping, the creation of an oversimplified view of other persons or groups. But stereotypes are not always so extreme, and they often function to simplify the world rather than to prepare us for killing. Events in the international arena are extremely complex, and they change at a dizzying pace. Faced with this complexity, it is a normal psychological response to simplify the world by using a relatively small number of mental categories. It is relatively difficult to keep in mind all of the subtle differences between communist nations such as the Soviet Union, East Germany and Romania or between 'free' nations such as the United States, England, and West Germany. But we can reduce this complexity by thinking in terms of "communism" and "democracy" or "East" and "West." For over forty years, we have used those simplifying categories to make sense out of the world order.

Although stereotypes can help us to simplify and order the world, they limit our view of the other by ignoring the complexity and the diversity of the other. Throughout the Cold War, Americans stereotype the Soviets as aggressive, cold and godless communists. Although this stereotype may be partially accurate, it overlooks the warmth of the Soviet people, their tremendous ethnic and religious diversity, and the small percentage of Communist Party members (under 10%). Although it was the Party rather than the people that traditionally wielded the power, the stereotypes failed to capture the marked differences in intentions and character of Soviet Leaders such as Stalin, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev. And, as revealed in the heated debates now

occurring in the Soviet Union, beneath the party line lies diversity of opinion and of individual styles and preferences. Where the world provides a wealth of diversity, a stereotype provides a colorless gray.

Stereotypes also invite dichotomous thinking. By labeling all countries as either "communist" or "noncommunist," we divided the world into "East" and "West". This hopelessly simplistic framework encourages us to overlook similarities between people in communist and noncommunist nations. It also ignores the rich regional and individual diversity of Third World nations, treating them as mere pawns in the East-West conflict. Similarly in the Mid-East, stereotypes of Arabs and Jews abound, leading people to analyze statements or actions as either pro-Arab or pro-Israeli and cementing the ideas that there are neither similarities and common interests nor other points of views.

Selective Perception and Remembering

We would all like to be relatively objective receivers and judges of information—few people set out intentionally to be biased. Yet without knowing it, our stereotypes shape what we perceive and remember. In particular, enemy images lead us to selectively attend to and remember negative aspects and actions of our adversaries.

In one study, American college students read a story in which a country took positive actions such as giving economic aid to the needy or negative actions such as building military bases or beaming radio broadcasts into China. For half of the students, the country was the Soviet Union, whereas for the other half, the country was Australia. All of the students read the identical story; only the name of the acting country was changed. When asked to recall the passage, the students who had read the "Soviet" story were more likely to remember negative, aggressive actions than were the students who had read the "Australian" story. Thus we are mentally primed to pick up and remember negative information about our adversaries.

This tendency is pernicious because it makes enemy images self-confirming and resistant to change. Viewing the world through the lens of the enemy image, we selectively pick up and remember the negative information that fits the image, thereby strengthening it. At the same time, we pay little attention to the favorable actions of the enemy, and this makes it difficult for us to see the enemy in a positive light. The end result is a closed mind that resists challenges to its rigidly held stereotypes.

Biased Attributions

Enemy images also bias our ideas about our adversaries' motives, portraying them in the worst possible light. In a study conducted in southern India, where there is extensive conflict between Hindus and Moslems, Hindu office clerks read short descriptions of either a Moslem or a Hindu behaving in friendly or unfriendly ways.

The clerks then chose the major reason that the person in the description behaved as he or she did. The Hindu clerks ascribed the friendly behaviors of the Hindu story characters to their personalities and the unfriendly behaviors to external circumstances (e.g., someone had been rude to the clerk earlier). In contrast, the clerks attributed the negative Moslem behaviors to negative personalities (e.g., they were unfriendly persons), and they ascribed friendly Moslem behaviors to external circumstances. Thus they made positive attributions about the Hindus and explained away their negative behaviors, but they made negative attributions about the Moslems, ascribing their negative behaviors to unpleasant, hostile personalities.

These same kinds of biased attributions have figured prominently in the Cold War. First, when nations assumed to be enemies perform actions that could be hostile, people tend to de-emphasize the situational pressures upon the enemy, regarding the actions as proof that the enemy is hostile or barbaric. For example, when the Soviets downed a civilian Korean airliner in 1983, the U.S. downplayed the importance of situational pressures that could have influenced the action. The U.S. has a history of spying on the area where the shooting occurred. In addition, pilots have concluded that it is quite possible to mistake an airliner like the KAL for an RC-135. Although these considerations do not justify the shooting, they suggest that the incident may not have been due entirely to a barbaric Soviet disposition.

By the same token, when enemy nations perform actions that might be considered peaceful, we tend to overemphasize the situational pressures affecting the enemy. As a result, we regard any peaceful behavior on the part of the adversary not as a sign of a desire for peace but as something they were forced into by the circumstances. When the Soviets, for example, began making dramatic arms reductions proposals under Gorbachev, many conservative analysts attributed these actions not to a genuine desire for peace but solely to economic and military pressures imposed by Americans having taken a hard line on defense.

Furthermore, when enemy images are very strong, we may attribute hostile motives to peaceful actions. Thus an adversary's peace proposal may appear to be a trick, a propaganda ploy, or a way of increasing tension among allies. In 1985, for example, when Soviet Premier Gorbachev announced a six-month unilateral freeze on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe, the *New York Times* reported that the proposal "seemed to officials here designed to cause dissension in NATO and undercut American interests in Europe."

Biased attributions create a double standard for judging behavior, making a particular action seem justified when we do it but unjustified when "they" do it. In several studies conducted in the 1980's, American college students read a list of Soviet actions such as shooting down a civilian airliner and shipping arms to another country. When asked to identify the motivations behind the actions, the students typically chose the most negative ones. But students who read the very same list of actions but who believed they had been done by Americans did not choose the most

negative motivations. Because of enemy images, we view nearly everything the enemy does as negatively motivated, whereas we regard our own motives as defensive and pure. In this manner, we adopt a Good-Bad view of the world in which we can do no wrong and in which we see the adversary as unswervingly diabolical. It is just this view that underlies enemy image rhetoric such as President Reagan's statement that the Soviet Union is the "focus of evil in the modern world."

Enemy images do not reside passively in the minds of their holders. Articulated by leaders and propagated by the mass media, they actively shape the behavior of groups and become deeply ingrained in social systems. Particularly when held over a long period of time, they fade into the background, acting as hidden assumptions that subtly influence policies and that escape critical scrutiny. An essential first step toward resisting their adverse influence is to ask how and why they affect our social behavior. Accordingly, this section reviews the principal social effects of enemy images. Then it examines the functions of enemy images, asking whether there are social benefits that encourage the construction of enemy images.

US vs THEM

As groups form, the members bond with each other, and they distinguish between their group and others, thereby drawing a line between "us" and "them." Enemy images amplify this process by forging unusually strong bonds within the group—nothing unites a group more strongly than an enemy. Feeling threatened by a hostile other, the group pulls together and develops an *esprit de corps* so strong that people are willing to die in order to protect the group.

In addition, the enemy images skew the process of distinguishing between "us" and "them." Viewed through the eyes of the enemy image, the "other" appears not only different but foreign, alien, and lacking in human qualities. This is no ordinary "other" but one that is imminently threatening.

This heightened perception of difference between "us" and "them," coupled with feelings of fear and hostility, leads us to overlook common interests and similarities. There appears to be an unbridgeable chasm between "us" and "them." Furthermore, this perception thwarts communication and impedes negotiation and other attempts to resolve conflict nonviolently. After all, if we have nothing in common, we have little to talk about, and if the enemy is truly hostile, attempts to communicate and negotiate will only be used to trick us or to weaken our resolve. Thus we forget that the enemy has human qualities and may have as strong an interest in security as we have.

Mirror Imaging

Enemy images are dangerous when they are held by even one party to a conflict. But typically they are held by all parties, and in mirror-image form. During the

Cold War, for example, the Soviets harbored the same kinds of dehumanized stereotypes and made the same kinds of biased perceptions and attributions about the U.S. that the U.S. made in regard to the Soviets. The Soviet media often deplored “the U.S. imperialists” for being highly aggressive and interventionist. Similarly, the Soviets described capitalism as morally corrupt, oppressive of minority peoples, and destined to collapse because of the social inequalities it creates. Because both the U.S. and the Soviet Union viewed each other through the distorting lens of the enemy image, enemy images became woven into the social fabric of U.S. –Soviet relations, where they continue to hamper the search for a safer relationship and new paths toward peace.

Mirror imaging can help set in motion a cascade of misperceptions on both sides of a conflict. With each side biased toward perceiving each other’s actions in the worst possible light, every statement and action becomes an additional source of hostility, ratcheting tensions up and fueling dangerous arms races. Since each side expects the worst from the other, they both take protective steps such as building new arms. But each side perceives these steps by the other as aggressive rather than defensive. By increasing tensions, the buildup of arms may actually help to bring about the crises and armed conflicts that they had been intended to prevent. In this sense, enemy images act as self-fulfilling prophecies.

The Value of Having Enemies

One of the questions that may have occurred to you is “If enemy images have such negative effects, then why do we form them?” In part, the answer is that enemy images have significant social functions, that is, they have a number of short-term benefits.

One benefit of enemy images is to divert attention from domestic problems. Politicians have long understood that if there are domestic problems such as poverty, homelessness, and internal unrest that threaten the current administration, one way to stay in office is to emphasize or cook up threats to one’s national security. This tactic not only diverts attention from the domestic problems but also encourages people to rally behind the current leaders for protection. Hitler, for example, rose to power largely by virtue of his ability to convince the Germans of a Jewish conspiracy and to play on the people’s sense of mistreatment at the hands of the victors of World War I. As shown by the negative outcome of the Nazi regime, whatever short-term benefits come from cultivating enemy images may be easily outweighed by negative long-term consequences.

Enemy images may also stimulate short-term economic gains—one can boost a sagging economy by increasing military spending and production. But to justify this spending, there must be a threat, which of course is exactly what enemy images provide. Caught amid the ambiguous and complex demands of competing constituencies and wanting to provide both jobs and security, politicians may drift

unknowingly into the practice of pointing to the external threat and expounding the need to build weapons to thwart it. In turn, the people often respond with a mixture of aroused patriotic fervor and gratitude for jobs, which influences their voting behavior. As a result, both the leaders and the people become locked into a social system in which enemy images exert a powerful influence on the economic life of the community.

Furthermore, nations may need enemy images to give people a sense of moral order and of legitimacy for acting in the international arena. Believing that “we” are good but that “they” are evil, we develop a clear sense of obligation to contain, thwart, and even overcome the enemy. This gives us a strong justification for building up a powerful military machine capable of killing millions of people. It also justifies invasions and other uses of our military might. If we attack another nation or group, it is not because we are wicked or aggressive but because we want to protect our citizens or our way of life from the enemy. Locked in the grip of enemy images, the people lose their ability to question their nation’s military actions, falling prey to simplistic and self-serving justifications of why their nation acted as it did. By providing all of the parties to a conflict with a ready justification for fighting, enemy images pave the way for war.

The idea that enemies fill a need helps to explain why nations are so fickle in forming enemy images, cultivating new ones as soon as the old ones weaken. Without identifiable enemies, the justifications for spending immense amounts on the military collapse. In addition, our moral legitimacy for military actions fades, weakening our resolve to use force to achieve U.S. interests. What better way to preserve the status quo and to keep us on our toes militarily than to garnish a new enemy image, focusing attention at one moment on a new economic threat such as Japan and at another moment on a dictator such as Noriega?

Although there are discernible pressures for and benefits of having enemies, there is no compelling evidence that we have an immutable, deep-seated psychological need for an enemy. By taking appropriate steps, we can resist enemy images and their ill effects.

BEYOND ENEMY IMAGES

Bilateral movement toward disarmament is one of the most important and effective steps that can be taken to achieve peace and to reduce enemy images. When all of the parties to a conflict make deep cuts in weaponry, they not only reduce the numbers of threatening weapons but also send a signal that they are willing to work together for mutual security. Yet dismantling weapons is only a first step, for arms reductions alone will not insure security if misperceptions, biased attributions, and the other processes discussed above continue to do their pernicious work. To build a durable peace, we must take psychological steps to dismantle the enemy image.

Education

Because enemy images thrive where there is ignorance, effective education about adversaries is a key component in a program to correct enemy images. The trouble is that enemy images resist education, particularly traditional forms of education such as lectures that attempt to transmit information about the adversary. People who have strong enemy images seldom listen to both sides. Instead, they select or reinterpret the presented information in a manner that fits their biases, and no amount of lecturing or reading will correct this situation. For example, an ardent peace activist who hears of a military plan for promoting peace may not try to acquire extensive information about the plan, rejecting it out of hand as an insincere gesture or a misguided idea. Thus enemy images encourage a close-mindedness that blocks effective listening, learning and dialogue.

This problem can be overcome by opening the educational program with activities for making people aware of their potential biases. In educating Americans about the Soviet Union, for example, one could discuss enemy images and their biasing effects before presenting information about the Soviet Union. By making people more aware of how they are processing the new information, this approach enables them to be more open-minded and to resist their own hidden biases. By making people more aware of their biases, this method counteracts the effects of propaganda and promotes the critical thinking that is necessary for making informed decisions. So powerful is this method that it has become a cornerstone of the Enemy Images Project.

Empathy

Enemy images lock the adversary behind a mask of enmity and otherness, obscuring human qualities and motives. To dismantle the enemy image, we must penetrate this mask by empathizing with the adversary, that is, by learning to see the world from their perspective. Empathy does not imply sympathy or acceptance of the adversary's actions. In empathizing with the enemy, we do not accept the adversary's values, feelings, and interpretations as our own, nor do we condone the adversary's behavior. Rather, the goals of empathy are to acquire a deeper understanding of the adversary's actual motives and to help us to look beyond our own limited point of view. When we do this, we simultaneously step out of our own perspective and acquire a more nuanced understanding of the adversary. What appear to be hostile actions from our perspective often appear to be defensive actions from the adversary's perspective. And what appear to be propaganda ploys from our perspective may appear to be genuine efforts at peacemaking from the adversary's perspective. In many cases, empathy puts a more human face on the adversary, showing us the human thoughts, fears, and foibles that guide their behavior.

One of the most effective ways of fostering empathy is role-playing, an activity in which audience members think and act as the adversary would (see the section on activities). For example, half of a group might be asked to act as Soviet citizens or leaders, while the other half act as American citizens or leaders. By having each group list the main characteristics of the other, processes such as mirror-imaging and attributional biases become apparent, and both groups learn about how Americans and Soviets view each other. A variation on this activity is to have both groups comment on events such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or the U.S. invasion of Panama, thereby identifying the differences in how the two countries interpret those events. Many factors determine the success of a role-playing activity, and you should consult the PsySR national office for tips on how to structure a role-play that increases empathy effectively.

Personal Connections

Enemy images lock people into a protective shell, encouraging them to avoid direct contact with the other. Making direct, person-to-person connections is a powerful method for overcoming enemy images. Citizen diplomacy, for example, has helped to dispel some of the most dehumanizing stereotypes that Americans and Soviets had of each other. When Americans and Soviets entered the warmth of each other's homes in unprecedented numbers in the latter part of the 1980s, they often discovered that the "other" had likeable human concerns—humor, skepticism, and love of family—and many of the same desires and concerns they themselves had. With the veil of enmity lifted and a modicum of rapport established, it became possible to communicate more effectively and to open oneself to learning about the adversary.

Contact alone, however, is not sufficient to counteract enemy images. In fact, people who have very strong enemy images have such biased perceptions that they selectively use information from visits and personal contacts with the adversary to confirm their preconceptions. Moreover, if tensions are very high, contact between adversaries may spark insults and fights that strengthen hostilities. To break down enemy images, contact should be emotionally positive, generating the warmth and good feelings that can offset lingering hostilities. It should also be between equals who will respect each other and who will not view the other as inferior. Finally, it should be oriented toward identifying common interests that reduce the sense of insurmountable differences that adversaries often have toward each other.

Cooperation

Enemy images promote intense rivalry and an attitude of "it's us or them." Feeling competitive and threatened, we forget that we may have interests in common with the adversary and that we can work together to achieve those interests. Research has shown repeatedly that getting adversaries to cooperate to achieve shared goals is one of the best ways of reducing enemy images. Through cooperation, adversaries learn that they have common interests, that teamwork is possible, and that the other

side is less diabolical than was previously believed. In addition, collaboration brings people together in a positive setting, fostering the formation of the personal bonds which help to overcome enemy images.

Today there are a multitude of transnational problems that invite cooperative efforts—preventing nuclear proliferation, reducing nuclear arsenals, stopping the spread of AIDS, reforesting Europe, cleaning up the environment, exploring space, and many others. Furthermore, the global economy has opened a vast array of possibilities for cooperative economic ventures, as evidenced in the attempt to establish a united European economic community.

CONCLUSION

Building a new world order requires new ways of thinking and the rejection of old enemy stereotypes. But old enemy images die hard, particularly when fear and hostility are rampant. Because of the historical changes afoot in Europe and the Soviet Union, we now have an unprecedented window of opportunity for changing enemy images, a time when people can set their fears aside and think in fresh ways about how to achieve a global peace. As the same time, we have an opportunity to counteract new exaggerated enemy images, whether they be about Latin American leaders, drug lords, or whomever, before they become deeply entrenched. To take advantage of these opportunities, we need to educate the public about the ill effects of enemy images and about other nations.

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