Below you will find a series of six
booster shots designed by psychologists to reduce the risk of being infected by
groupthink. Write down your answers to each
of the multiple choice questions and check them against the correct answers
available below.
Booster Shots #1
The
following quote is from a chapter written by Irving Janis (1997) for the third edition of the book A First Look at Communication Theory by
As the person in charge of the Flight
Readiness Review for NASA, Jesse Moore had the ultimate authority to approve or
scrub the shuttle mission. He relied on the assessments of managers at the
Kennedy, Johnson, and Marshall Space Centers, who in turn consulted with
engineers from the companies that designed the Challenger’ s subsystems. The film Apollo 13 dramatized the final phase of this ‘‘go/no-go"
launch procedure. NASA has always taken the position that ‘‘a launch should be
canceled if there is any doubt of its safety."
The day before the launch, Morton
Thiokol engineers warned that the flight might be risky. As the team
responsible for the performance of the rocket booster, they worried about the
below-freezing temperature that was forecast for the morning of the launch. The
O-ring seals had never been tested below 53 degrees Fahrenheit, and as Thiokol
engineer Roger Boisjoly later testified, getting the
O-rings to seal gaps with the temperature in the 20s was like ‘‘trying to shove
a brick into a crack versus a sponge."
The O-ring seals had long been
classified a critical component on the rocket motor, ‘‘a failure point—without
back-up—that could cause a loss of life or vehicle if the component
failed." Yet when Thiokol engineers
raised the safety issue in a teleconference, NASA personnel discounted their
concerns and urged them to reconsider their recommendation. After an off-line caucus with company
executives, Thiokol engineers reversed their ‘‘no-go" position and
announced that their solid rocket motor was ready to fly. When the Kennedy,
Johnson, and
1.
Jesse Moore’s leadership at NASA did not avert groupthink in the
Challenger disaster primarily because of
a. Lack of impartial
leadership
b. Self-censorship of
his managers
c. Belief in inherent
morality
2.
Morton Thiokol engineers probably changed their position for launch
because of
a. Homogenous
background or ideology
b. Closed-mindedness
c. Pressure toward uniformity
Booster
Shots #2
A group of peace activists are
attending a meeting to try to stop the
3.
Fiona was serving as a ______________ in this group.
a. mindguard
b. devil’s advocate
c. assessor of
external stress
4.
Sam’s behavior in the group is consistent with
a. a mind guard.
b. self-censorship.
c. close-mindedness.
Booster
Shots #3
A group of peace activists are
attending a meeting to try to stop the
5.
The potential for groupthink might have been lessened in this group if
the group
a. had a common ideology
b. would carefully consider alternatives
c. would designate a mindguard to
keep the group focused.
6.
If Sam would have expressed a belief that the Bush administration
were not insane but rationally working from different assumptions, he
would have been
a. acting based on a
strong ideology
b. engaging in
collective rationalization.
c. serving as a
devil’s advocate.
Booster
Shot #4
7.
Which of the following is NOT
a symptom of groupthink?
a. Believing in the
group's morality.
b. Exercising direct
pressure on others.
c. Not expressing
your true feelings.
d. Presence of a
devil’s advocate in the group.
8.
Groupthink usually occurs in groups that are highly cohesive and people
want to get along.
True
False
9.
When a group decides what should be done, it should act and not revisit
other options.
True
False
Booster
Shot #5
10.
Which of the following is NOT
a solution for groupthink?
a. using a devil’s
advocate.
b. using mindguards.
c. using outside experts.
d. using a policy-forming subgroup which reports to the
larger group.
11.
It is a good idea to have leaders remain
impartial.
True
False
12.
Strong beliefs in the group’s morality is a
positive factor in the reduction of groupthink.
True
False
Booster
Shot #6
Janis describes a story in his book Groupthink (2nd Ed) (p. 8)
about a group that was designed to assist middle class men and women quit
smoking. Shortly after the group began
meeting, one member quit smoking totally and told the other members that they
should be strong and just stop “cold turkey”.
Immediately after expressing his views, this early quitter was attacked
by the other members, who believed that in order to quit smoking a person needs
to do so in a gradual way and that sheer will power is not enough. At the next meeting the early quitter
essentially told the group that they were correct, that he would continue to
participate, that he was smoking two packs of cigarettes a day again, and that
he would stop after the last meeting.
When Janis and one of colleagues pointed the dynamics of the early
quitter’s behavior in a smoking cessation group, the other members reiterated
their belief that smoking could only be cured gradually over a long period of
time.
13.
The early quitter’s smoking of two packs of cigarettes a day after
having stopped was a result of
a. highly selective
information gathering.
b. group exercising
direct pressure to conform.
c. rationalizing poor
decision making.
14.
The groups’ failure to take the comments of Janis and his colleague
seriously was the result of
a. being selective in
information gathering.
b. not seeking expert
opinion.
c. using a policy
forming group.
Check your answers against the correct answers here.